Taiwan is on the front line of international defense against expansionist authoritarianism. Yet, US President Joe Biden’s proposed new aid package includes US$61.4 billion for the war in Ukraine, US$14.3 billion to help Israel fight its war against Hamas, and just US$2 billion for security assistance for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
The wars Ukraine and Israel are fighting should not obscure Taiwan’s vulnerability to a Chinese attack.
Indeed, the defense of Taiwan must assume greater significance for international security, given that three successive US administrations have failed to credibly push back against China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, whose geopolitical map Beijing has fundamentally altered. Having already swallowed Hong Kong, China may be itching to move on Taiwan, whose incorporation Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has called a “historic mission.” By rehearsing amphibious and air attacks, China has displayed a willingness to seize Taiwan by force.
With the US attention now focused on the wars that Ukraine and Israel are fighting, Xi could be tempted to move against Taiwan at an opportune time. Xi must be observing how Biden’s transfers of critical munitions to Israel are depleting US stockpiles, which were already running low because the US sent Ukraine more than two million artillery shells and other ammunition. Xi could choose to wait until US arsenals deplete further.
In a Taiwan war scenario, the US would likely come to Taipei’s defense not singlehandedly but as part of a coalition, by seeking to rope in its two main allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea. From Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya to Ukraine, the US has led “coalitions of the willing” in wars.
In fact, any Chinese operation to cut off access to Taiwan would likely intrude into Japanese airspace and likely pull Japan into the conflict. This was apparent when five Chinese missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone last year during China’s live-fire military drills around Taiwan that effectively simulated an air and sea blockade.
South Korea, however, may find it difficult to directly assist US-led operations to help Taiwan repulse a Chinese attack. This writer’s recent discussions in Seoul indicated that, given its overriding priority to deter a North Korean attack, South Korea would likely be reluctant to get drawn into a Taiwan Strait conflict for fear that that this could create an opening for North Korea to launch aggression — or at least military provocations — against it.
South Korea’s military strength, in any case, centers on its ground forces, not on naval and air forces that would be central to Taiwan’s defense against a Chinese attack.
In fact, a South Korea that directly aided Taiwan’s defense against a Chinese attack would likely face serious punishment from China, which could even push North Korea to open a front against South Korea.
To make matters worse, Russia also appears to be fashioning a North Korea card against South Korea. South Korea’s indirect supply of critical munitions to Ukraine via the US was a likely factor in Russia’s hosting of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last month. Russian President Vladimir Putin had warned that Seoul would face consequences if it supplied weapons to Ukraine.
Since late last year, South Korea has shipped at least hundreds of thousands of artillery shells to the US, thereby allowing America to continue supplying such munitions to Ukraine for use in fighting Russia. More broadly, the war in Ukraine has helped turn South Korea into a major arms exporter, including of tanks, missiles, howitzers, armored vehicles and warplanes.
Against this backdrop, Russia now seems willing to play the North Korea card against South Korea, including by dangling the threat of transferring sensitive technologies to Pyongyang. North Korea, whose second attempt to launch a spy satellite into orbit failed in August, is seeking access to Russian technologies in return for possibly aiding Russia’s war effort in Ukraine by supplying artillery shells and rockets.
In relation to China, the risk for Seoul would be that, even if it refrained from coming to Taiwan’s aid in a war scenario, Beijing would view South Korea as providing indirect assistance to US-led operations, including logistic and weapons support. Beijing thus could possibly egg on North Korea to rein in South Korea.
A two-war scenario in Asia, with simultaneous conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, would be a geopolitical and military nightmare for the US, which is currently struggling to meet its weapons commitments to Ukraine and Israel in the wars they face.
In this light, deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan ought to assume greater priority in US policy. Taiwan cannot be allowed to become the next Ukraine or Hong Kong.
Taiwan’s subjugation would significantly advance China’s hegemonic ambitions in Asia and upend the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, not least by enabling China to break out of the so-called first island chain.
America’s role is central to Taiwan’s autonomous future. A US that fails to prevent Taiwan’s subjugation would be widely seen as unable or unwilling to defend any other ally, including Japan, which hosts more American troops than any other foreign nation. This, in turn, could unravel US alliances in Asia.
Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).
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