Next year, both Taiwan and Indonesia are to hold presidential elections. Taiwan’s election is set for Jan. 13, while Indonesia’s is scheduled for a month later on Feb. 14. These elections are crucial for both countries as they are to choose a new president, as the incumbents are ineligible to seek a third term.
Taiwan and Indonesia share a similar trajectory in their democratic journeys. Both countries faced prolonged struggles against authoritarian regimes before eventually transitioning to democracy during the third wave of democratization that swept across Asia in the 1990s.
While Taiwan experienced a relatively peaceful transition to democracy, Indonesia endured political riots that ultimately put an end to thirty-two years of authoritarian rule.
In terms of democratic development, Taiwan has emerged as a leader in its democratic performance. For instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index for last year ranked Taiwan 10th in the world and first in Asia, reaffirming its status as a full democracy.
Despite these remarkable achievements, Taiwan’s democratic practices are not always widely recognized or shared. It is especially pertinent in Southeast Asia, where the promotion of democracy in the region is often viewed as an internal matter for each state, and Taipei has limited channels to support democratic enhancement.
Nevertheless, Taiwan could still play a crucial role in promoting democracy in Southeast Asia by supporting the political participation of the Indonesian diaspora in the upcoming presidential elections. Unlike Taiwan, the Indonesian electoral system permits overseas voting.
The Indonesian Central Election Commission, known as the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), with support from Indonesian embassies and missions abroad, oversees and forms the Overseas Election Committee, or Panitia Pemilihan Luar Negeri (PPLN). The PPLN is responsible for compiling voter lists, organizing voting, disseminating information about voting and tabulating the results of voting.
Political participation is a fundamental aspect of democracy, and it stands as a primary objective for both the KPU and PPLN Taipei.
So how could Taiwan help?
First, granting leave for Indonesian migrant workers on election day, thus enabling them to visit polling stations and cast their votes. This is particularly important because some workers, depending on the terms of their contracts and their jobs in Taiwan, are not entitled to take leave or they have limited time to leave their workplace.
Indonesian migrant workers form the majority of the Indonesian diaspora in Taiwan, alongside students and foreign spouses. As of August last year, the Ministry of Labor (MOL) recorded 264,391 Indonesian migrant workers residing in the country.
The KPU and PPLN Taipei have established 54 polling stations and six mobile ballot boxes across the country, from northern to southern Taiwan, including the outlying islands. Voters could also utilize postal services. It is estimated that more than 230,000 eligible voters are to vote in the upcoming Indonesian election.
Second, prior to the 2019 election, the Indonesian Economic and Trade Office (IETO) sent letters and information to Taiwanese employers to promote awareness about the election. The MOL could assist the IETO by encouraging these employers to support their Indonesian workers’ participation in the election.
Indonesian migrant workers in Taiwan constitute the second-largest population of migrant workers, after Malaysia. Their engagement with the upcoming election is crucial in determining the future of Indonesia.
Third, Taiwanese media could promote awareness about the election through news and other outreach. Radio Taiwan International, for example, has already taken the initiative by inviting members of the PPLN Taipei to discuss the Indonesian election and its implementation in Taiwan on their podcast. Other media outlets could adopt similar methods, helping channel democratic causes in Indonesia.
These Indonesian voters are constituents of their country, and the government in Indonesia has political and moral obligations to preserve the rights of its citizens in sustaining Indonesia’s democratic aspirations.
Taiwan, as a beacon of democracy in Asia, could support democratic development in the region at home. This is a unique opportunity for Taiwan that must not be overlooked.
Ratih Kabinawa is a doctoral candidate in international relations and Asian studies at the University of Western Australia.
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