On his way to Paraguay, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Vice President William Lai (賴清德) stopped over in the US. After this seven-day trip, Lai’s strategy of playing safe has continued to influence the US, China and Taiwan.
The “play-safe” strategy was created together by the US and Taiwan. Its purpose was to keep China in check. Lai’s strategy has demonstrated how both countries have been well-coordinated, and that Taiwan has been keeping this promise with self-restraint. Through Lai’s trip, the US and Taiwan have established a collaboration through which mutual trust can be reinforced.
Connotations appear in this collaborative mode. Even though the Chinese government condemned Lai’s stopovers and threatened the nation with more military drills, Taiwan and the US could choose to reject the authoritarian constraints declared by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Taiwan insisted on Lai stopping over in the US, and the US agreed to arrange stopovers. Lai was greeted by the US with a high standard, even though his trip was not entirely political in nature. In other words, the US treated Lai with substantial courtesy.
Discerning reporters would have noticed how Lai was treated differently than former Taiwanese vice presidents who had stopped over in the US via an airliner rather than on flight arrangements for government officials, which meant they had to pass through jet bridges before being received.
This time, the US government sent a motorcade so that Lai and other Taiwanese officials could be received right after they got off the aircraft.
The motorcade was led by US police, who were responsible for Lai’s activities while outdoors in the US. Washington treated Lai as it would treat any non-US president, prime minister, or any other foreign officials visiting its country.
What Lai demonstrated for the US and China has a twofold meaning. First, it is worth noting the banquet held in San Francisco. Lai was welcomed by high-spirited overseas Taiwanese with passion as he talked about how Taiwan and the US could collaborate in the realms of economy and technology. Although Lai did not talk much about the election campaign in Taiwan, he did say in an interview with Bloomberg Businessweek that he had no plans to pursue formal independence, and that “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China.” These statements are fair and moderate, and must have changed some people’s presumption about Lai.
Just as President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has previously said, the nation must not flinch when pressurized, and it should not take risks after having gained more support. This strategic quality inherited from Tsai would help Lai shape his character as the future leader of Taiwan. Lai has said that he would adhere to Tsai’s path, and his seven-day trip suggests his pledge should be taken seriously. Washington would view Lai to be of similar character to Tsai — a reliable partner with whom the US government can work together.
Moreover, Lai wanted the world to know that if the CCP decides to take any provocative action, China’s move is unilateral and cannot be justified.
How would China consider Lai’s modesty and self-restraint? China would bash Lai on the pretext of his stance of pro-Taiwanese independence. It has been China’s strategy to prevent the DPP from going too far, and has been a fixation of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), who is dealing with troubles both at home and abroad. Beijing utilized this strategy after Lai’s trip, as China’s Taiwan Affairs Office accused Lai of his actions, resulting in some military drills being carried out to show off China’s military might.
However, the Chinese government, which has always emphasized the need to be pragmatic, does not have a contingency plan should Lai become Taiwan’s president-elect.
Will Beijing going be the same as it has been over the past eight years? Will Beijing not be more flexible in its strategic planning, so that it can communicate with the Taiwanese government? Will Beijing not improve the situation in which Taiwan leans toward the US while turning its back on China?
As far as Taiwanese are concerned, Lai has completed his mission. The successful diplomatic trip was concluded smoothly. He has passed the “job interview,” many others have said. Lai’s achievement has set the bar for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party presidential candidates to overcome if they are to visit the US.
The work on foreign affairs is unlike that of domestic election campaigns. In the international community, a leader should demonstrate his vision rather than criticizing and berating others. The opposition parties should be prepared for such work. Our country needs a visionary leader who can guide us through the difficulties with a steady hand. A future leader should consider seriously if he can take responsibility for the entire country. This is not a high-flown, rhetorical question, but one about Taiwan’s survival.
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the sister newspaper of the Taipei Times).
Translated by Emma Liu
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