A recent survey conducted by Pew Research Center found that 43 percent of Indians have an “unfavorable” view of Taiwan, while 35 percent have a favorable view of neither China nor Taiwan. Thus, a significantly large proportion of Indians not only have an “unfavorable” view of Taiwan, but have an equally unfavorable view of China and Taiwan, indicating that they might not see any difference between them.
The background knowledge of this author, who has followed China and Taiwan for a decade and a half, does not support the findings. That ordinary Indians have an “unfavorable” view of Taiwan is unconvincing because there is no logical or commonsense explanation as to why this should be the case.
Indians have generally been unaware of Taiwan, or they have taken a benign view of it. In my years of research and writing on Taiwan, I have not come across a single academic or journalistic piece of writing that is decidedly “unfavorable” or “negative” toward Taiwan.
In fact, in the past few years, after the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 and the ongoing military standoff between China and India that began in April-May 2020, there has seen an upsurge in pro-Taiwan sentiment in India. It has been seen in media op-eds and editorials, increased TV coverage, think tank publications, research writings, and favorable opinions expressed by retired diplomats and military officers.
Retired diplomats traveling to Taiwan and writing pieces in the media or on think tank Web sites advocating better relations with Taiwan have become common. In a rare occurrence, three just-retired service chiefs attended the Ketagalan Forum in Taipei this month.
The media have reported that India’s chief of defense staff has asked the armed forces to study the implications of an all-out China-Taiwan war and India’s options. Some politicians have also occasionally spoken in support of Taiwan. Furthermore, there have been intense discussions between the two sides regarding collaboration in diversifying supply chains, particularly for semiconductor cooperation.
Taiwan is also to open a new representative office in Mumbai.
These positive developments do not lead to the conclusion that India has a “negative” attitude toward Taiwan.
Indian views toward Taiwan can be categorized in three ways:
First, there has been Kautilyan advocacy of “the enemy’s enemy is my friend,” arguing for defense and intelligence cooperation, and consideration of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.
Second, a relatively more nuanced and mainstream view has emerged that supports improving and deepening cooperation and collaboration with Taiwan without violating China’s “red line,” which means without disturbing India’s well-known and consistent “one China” position.
Third, there is a view that does not oppose cooperation and collaboration, but emphasizes that greater caution be exercised.
The third view does not emerge from published writings, but mainly from conversations with people who are intimately involved in India’s foreign and security policies. They are concerned about the penetration of Chinese agencies into the Taiwanese system.
Sometimes, they voice extreme-case scenarios; for example, what if Taiwan is reunified [sic] with China?
As an illustration, I was once told that the Indian army would prefer only paperless cooperation with the Taiwanese army and would shun any cooperation that entails the exchange of papers in any form.
None of the three categories suggests that India has an “unfavorable” or “negative” attitude toward Taiwan. The second and third categories basically display caution and prudence, which almost every other country exercises in its relations with Taiwan.
As for Indians having a favorable view of neither China nor Taiwan, it is compelling to wonder whether they do not see any difference between them. Those Indians who follow Taiwan might have their own views on the Taiwan issue, but they are very much aware of its de facto independent status and the positivity it conveys toward India, opposite to the negativity that is perceived from China.
So why would they treat the two the same by being equally “unfavorable” toward both of them?
The terms “unfavorable” and “negative” need to be defined. In the survey summary, the word “negative” was used to denote “unfavorable.” Caution and prudence do not amount to “unfavorable” or “negative.” Besides, there is a chance that in the minds of Indians, who do not think in English, the words “favorable” and “unfavorable” are not processed in the same manner as phrases or questions such as who they would consider friendlier toward India — China or Taiwan?
Another example would be that if you survey Indians and ask a simple question about whether India should diplomatically recognize Taiwan; the results could be surprisingly supportive.
Pew Research Center did not say whether there were any follow-up questions to determine why the respondents had “unfavorable” or “favorable” views; we await a detailed questionnaire.
It said in response to Sana Hashmi’s critique (“Pew wrong about Indians’ views,” Aug. 16, page 8): “Our poll in India, conducted from March 25 to May 11, involved surveying 2,611 Indians face-to-face in 11 languages across 263 villages and towns, in urban and rural areas.”
However, Taiwan is not an object of mass interest in India, unlike, perhaps, in the US and Japan. That privilege is reserved for China, Pakistan and the US. In the event that opinions are being collected from random members of society, there is a high chance that these are not informed opinions.
Furthermore, the possibility of a psychological tendency to lump all distant things together and casually dismiss them could also not be precluded. This probing is necessary because the survey findings do not square with the positivity that has been observed in bilateral ties in recent years.
The Pew survey raises more questions rather than offering corroboration. Unless there are properly defined terms, proper supplementary questions and a fair idea about the people surveyed, the findings run the risk of painting the Indian attitude toward Taiwan in the wrong color.
Prashant Kumar Singh is a research fellow and coordinator of the East Asia Centre at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
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