Former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso last week visited Taiwan and spoke at the Ketagalan Forum: Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue in Taipei. He was the highest-ranking former Japanese official to visit Taiwan since the countries severed diplomatic relations in 1972.
Meanwhile, amid the rapid growth of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), security in the Indo-Pacific region is full of uncertainties.
In the past few years, the PLA has constantly harassed Taiwan. The increased frequency of Chinese warplanes and warships crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone has given the world the impression that Beijing might take unexpected military actions in the Strait.
From this perspective, even though Taiwan and Japan do not have formal diplomatic relations, they are both in the first island chain. Should a military conflict occur in the Strait, the PLA would blockade Taiwan, which would in turn affect Japan’s air and sea security, so Tokyo has great urgency to pay attention to developments in the Strait.
Although New Zealand, in the southern hemisphere, is far from Taiwan, it addressed China in its National Security Strategy released on Aug. 4. The white paper says that “China has become more assertive and more willing to challenge existing international rules and norms.”
The report says that New Zealand should invest more resources in national defense and security. Although the details of any military buildup plan by Wellington have not been disclosed, the policy paper shows that it attaches the same level of importance to security in the Indo-Pacific region as other nations.
Taiwan, Japan and New Zealand are all “island states” in the Indo-Pacific region. Competition between the US and China in the region is gradually growing in intensity. In response to the possibility of a cross-strait war, the US has been carrying out bilateral and multilateral military exercises with allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, while also bolstering the air and sea power of Indo-Pacific nations through arms sales.
Japan and New Zealand have now expressed their willingness to enhance their national defense forces, and this might be due to the “spillover effect” of cross-strait tensions to neighboring countries. When countries build up their national defense capabilities, they are bolstering the “security resilience” and military deterrence in the region at the same time.
Although these countries do not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, security in the Strait has become one of the most pressing issues in the region. Taiwan does not always face the powerful PLA alone under such circumstances.
Ray Song is a doctoral student in Tamkang University’s Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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