Recently, former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) secretary-general King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) must have felt he could relate to the character of Zhuge Liang (諸葛亮) in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (三國演義).
Known as one of the greatest Chinese statesmen and strategists, Zhuge Liang served emperor Liu Shan (劉禪) faithfully until his death, despite Liu’s incompetence and the decline of the Han kingdom.
As former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) friend and confidant, King made a name for himself by helping Ma secure two terms in office with his strategic advice and political acumen. As one who excelled at helping Ma take out “obstacles” and rivals left and right in and out of office, King earned the nickname “The Knife” (金小刀) for his uncompromising, ruthless and cut-throat style. King went out of the limelight with Ma in 2016.
It was at New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi’s (侯友宜) invitation that King came out of retirement last month, creating a stir in the KMT. Over a month, King’s presence on board as campaign director has worked magic. In contrast to his former stance of sitting out on every issue, Hou has embraced the hallmarks of Ma’s administration with open arms, including the so-called “1992 consensus,” the cross-strait service trade agreement and nuclear power, in an act to win back the support of deep-blue voters.
However, King has a more daunting task ahead of him than just giving Hou a personality and a voice. As Hou’s support ratings are still the lowest out of the three candidates, the KMT has split into three forces working for different goals.
The first faction is mostly made up of Hou’s men and King, whose primary goal was to focus on closing the gap between Hou and former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) and hopefully, on having Hou face Vice President William Lai (賴清德) in the presidential election. In short, they would rather suffer a metaphorical martyrdom than entertain any solutions other than having Hou as their candidate.
The second includes KMT members who are entering the legislative elections next year. Having read the runes and anxious about their political interests, they are openly defecting to Ko by appearing in the same interview and other events in the hope of garnering support from Ko’s voters. These are the major campaigners for the “anti-Democratic Progressive Party alliance,” and their goal is to support any candidate who has the biggest opportunity to defeat Lai.
As one equipped with political acumen, King is aware of the damage and trouble that the second faction is causing to the KMT’s image and support ratings. While King might have been able to take out troublemakers with just a look or a gesture back in the days of Ma, he is no longer able to wield that “knife” as dexterously with Hou. Since Hou is not the chairman, he does not hold the power to mete out penalties or establish rules about members’ conduct. All that power lies with KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫).
However, it would seem Chu has other plans. As the head of the KMT, Chu must be thinking about the party’s future rather than just the presidency. As Hou’s odds are not looking great, Chu proposed to form a “governance alliance” at the KMT National Congress on Sunday, which had people wondering if Chu was hinting at the possibility of uniting with the TPP to put Ko in office while having the KMT’s people, such as himself, as premier and in other major positions. As exchanging interests is not uncommon in the KMT’s history, it is possible that Chu is purposely turning a blind eye to the troublemakers. After all, Chu has his own political interests to look out for, if Hou fails to make it into office next year.
Despite King’s outstanding intelligence and political savvy, he might find himself more and more like Zhuge Liang in days to come: faithfully working for a mediocre monarch, while surrounded by a pack of opportunists sparing no effort to drag him and his campaign down.
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