This year, two countries have been thrust into the global spotlight: Finland, which on Tuesday last week became the 31st member of NATO, and Taiwan, which again became the center of attention as President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), on behalf of the Taiwanese public, held a joint news conference alongside US House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, in what was another sign of growing ties between Taipei and Washington.
For the entirety of last year, pundits drew parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine, and such prevailing trends of international relations remain relatively unchanged. In view of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Finland has made a historic decision in ditching its long-held policy toward Russia since World War II in a bid to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.
The invasion of Ukraine has intensified global concerns about Taiwan, which has long faced the threat of Chinese aggression. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) secured a third term in office, China has only increased its coercion and intimidation against Taiwan.
In response, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to seek a way out by deepening ties and normalizing high-level bilateral interaction with the US despite China’s ire.
There has been a major shift in the global community, but people might not be able to pinpoint the precise reason behind it.
The underlying cause for the shift in the US-China relationship has gone from strategic cooperation to rivalry to opposition.
With the closing of the “two sessions,” Xi visited Russia and vowed to solidify a “strategic partnership of coordination” between the countries.
The world is entering a bipolar system involving two opposing values and systems — a crossroad at which democracies and autocracies inevitably collide.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi are the main aggressors intent on upsetting global realities.
With this context in mind, people would have less trouble understanding the major political and geopolitical shift for the past decade. As countries started taking sides, the democratic camp had every reason to support an ally in need.
After being noted for decades as a neutral presence, Finland gave up on its neutrality and joined the US and its NATO allies in exchange for security. If Sweden could lay Turkey’s objections to rest, then it could follow Finland into becoming a new member of NATO.
The timeline has suggested that NATO’s eastward expansion cannot be regarded as justification for Ukraine’s invasion as Putin has claimed, but it was the consequences that caused it. These small nations were compelled to take a side for fear of what Putin did and might do next.
Like Ukraine, people might also easily see Taiwan in Finland’s example, as all three are threatened by bellicose neighbors. As Taiwan has explored various solutions over the years, it has adopted a policy akin to “Finlandization” as well, especially when it was hit by the first wave of China’s ascent to power.
During former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) term in office from 2008 to 2016, Taiwan also exerted appeasement, restraint and self-censorship on its politics, economy and culture, which US academics consider to be classic traits of “Finlandization of Taiwan.” Ma’s recent visit to China and so-called “peacemaking” measures promoted by others are similarly in line with such a policy.
However, Finland has had a rude awakening.
Tsai’s meeting with McCarthy at a news conference on Wednesday last week drew nearly 200 journalists from around the world, enough to see the significance of the event in global media. Taiwan’s global status owes a lot to Xi’s oppression.
Taipei can adopt any model, but cannot afford to repeat Finland’s playbook of being subservient to a bigger country.
If Taiwan decides to seek independence, then as “one who is virtuous,” it “shall not stand alone” by having diplomatic ties with other nations. Any Taiwanese president would have to adopt this model if they wish to lead a democratic nation on the right path.
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the sister newspaper of the Taipei Times.
Translated by Rita Wang
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