Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has eschewed overseas travel. After a three-year hiatus during the pandemic, she has resumed her international trips departing on a visit to Central American diplomatic allies Guatemala and Belize on Wednesday morning, which she called a “journey of prosperity with democratic partners.”
Even though she is merely in the US for an informal “transit,” her time there is undoubtedly in the news.
Tsai’s planned stopovers in New York and Los Angeles, two prominent business hubs on the east and west coasts of the US, have drawn attention from people from all walks of life in Taiwan and are of immense strategic significance.
The political and economic life of the world is centered on New York. The Council on Foreign Relations, the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and the Roosevelt Institute are among the think tanks that call it home. It also houses the UN headquarters.
Hence, meeting there with prominent public leaders, professionals, specialists and academics from other countries is pretty convenient for Tsai. Her selection of New York is a clear indication of her victory, supposing she will not rile up China or enter the US capital, Washington. There has long been an unwritten rule that Taiwanese presidents are not allowed to travel to Washington or make formal trips to the US.
Tsai could possibly meet US House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy during her anticipated stopover in California before heading home, which would be a significant diplomatic victory for her administration.
China, on the other hand, would interpret such a move as a “provocation” and “take resolute measures to counter this,” a representative for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said.
There are still unanswered questions, such as whether Tsai’s meeting with McCarthy, if it happens, would provide Beijing with yet another pretext to conduct military drills to further terrorize Taiwan.
Since the nation is the most sensitive issue that has haunted the Sino-US relationship, Tsai’s visit could heighten the already tense ties between the two giants. Tsai’s US transits are to occur at a time when Sino-US relations are at their lowest point since 1979, when Washington normalized relations with Beijing and switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei.
However, Tsai has stood by her choice, declaring that Taiwan would staunchly uphold the values of freedom and democracy, and remain a good member of the global community.
Practically speaking, it is crucial that the US has allowed Tsai to transit in New York and Los Angeles at a time when her time in office is to end soon and Taiwan has begun preparations for the next presidential election early next year.
While handling such visit by Tsai with “extreme care,” the administration of US President Joe Biden has shown its moral support for its increasingly important partner.
Tsai’s plan to visit New York has received a lot of praise because of her clear success in winning the US’ high appreciation and support over the past seven years.
Although the US does not maintain official relations with the Republic of China, widely known as Taiwan, the nation — “a leading democracy and a technological powerhouse” — “is a key US partner in the Indo-Pacific,” given that both sides “share similar values, deep commercial and economic links, and strong people-to-people ties,” the US government’s fact sheet on relations with Taiwan says.
The relationship between the US and the self-governing democracy has rapidly advanced in the past few years under Tsai’s leadership. Taiwan has been successful in gaining endorsements of current and former US foreign policy decisionmakers. The US’ Taiwan Travel Act, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act, the PROTECT Taiwan Act, and the Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act are only a few of the Taiwan-friendly bills passed by the US Congress.
In general, the US has entered a delicate era in its relationship with China, which is more confrontational, while forging unofficial ties and defense cooperation with Taiwan. It should not be ruled out that the competitive climate between Washington and Beijing played a key role in the development of Taiwan-US relations, but Tsai’s and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ persistent attempts to win over the US side also had an impact.
Tsai’s stopover plans have left China with emotional baggage. Not to mention launching missiles or military drills close to the Taiwan Strait to threaten the nation, China might conceivably intensify its pressure on Taiwan.
However, such a step would undoubtedly draw attention to the contrast between China as a totalitarian regime and Taiwan as a supporter of global democracy. Given that Beijing has no justification for using the US transit of Taiwan’s president as rationale for exercising its power over the nation, forceful moves by China against Taiwan would only widen the rift between Washington and Beijing while turning Taiwan into a potential flashpoint between the two superpowers.
Even though it would not be an official visit, Tsai’s brief sojourn in the US stands out as the best illustration of the cordial ties between Taipei and Washington. To ensure that the trip further raises the nation’s international profile, all political parties in Taiwan should join the ruling party in expressing their unwavering support for her visit. The justification for this is to give access to the diplomatic resources Tsai leaves to her successor.
Taiwan will be able to cooperate with the US more confidently as the two nations are facing the looming challenges from China as these diplomatic efforts reach a successful conclusion.
Huynh Tam Sang is a lecturer in Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities’ Faculty of International Relations, a Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program member and research fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation.
Chen Kuan-ting is CEO of the Taiwan NextGen Foundation.
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