To boost the nation’s birthrate, the government offers childcare subsidies and child-rearing allowances for parents of children younger than three. The policy is well-intentioned and, starting this year, regardless of household income, all can apply for the benefits.
It is clear that the government has worked hard to address the issue of the declining birthrate in Taiwan.
However, the policy is full of contradictions and many find the details unfair. Most parents have reason to feel let down by conditions surrounding the benefits. Premier Chen Chien-jen (陳建仁) and his new team must re-examine the policy.
Parents can apply for either a childcare subsidy or child-rearing allowance. Parents whose children are taken care of by registered childcare agencies can receive a monthly subsidy of up to NT$5,500, or NT$8,500 if their children attend so-called “semi-public” nurseries.
However, parents who look after their own children or seek assistance from individual childcare providers can only apply for an allowance of NT$5,000. It is the same for those who send their children to private daycare centers — those without a government contract.
The purpose of having two systems is incomprehensible and the rationale behind it runs counter to education subsidies for civil servants.
It is difficult to access public or semi-public childcare, especially for families living in metropolitan areas. Parents who wish to send their children to public or quasi-public agencies have to go through the process of drawing lots that are difficult to win. The acceptance rate in Taipei is about 30 percent and 20 percent for the most popular public kindergarten in New Taipei City. A 2021 news report said that the rate was only 0.2 percent in Taichung’s Situn District (西屯).
In other words, few children are able to attend public or semi-public childcare centers.
Neither is it easy to find a spot at a “semi-public” childcare provider. When such a childcare provider advertises open spots on Facebook, it is inundated with requests for further information. Parents who fail to get public childcare either try to find a private agency or quit their job as a last resort to look after their children.
Private childcare centers charge more than public and semi-public ones and a lot of income is forfeited by quitting a job.
However, such parents are only eligible for the child-rearing allowance.
Those who can access public or semi-public childcare pay less while receiving more in subsidies, while those who cannot have to pay more for childcare service, but receive less in benefits.
This arrangement is very different from education subsidies for civil servants. If a civil servant’s child has to pay a higher tuition, the parents receive a larger government subsidy. The subsidy for a civil servant with a child attending a public university is NT$13,600, or NT$35,800 if the child goes to private university. The same system applies to those with children attending high school. The higher the tuition, the higher the subsidies.
The childcare subsidy system needs to be revised — especially as most parents are unable to access public childcare.
Yang Jisien is an assistant professor living in Kaohsiung.
Translated by Emma Liu
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