Former Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lo Chih-ming (羅志明) and retired navy major general Hsia Fu-hsiang (夏復翔) were on Thursday released on bail after they were questioned by prosecutors in relation to alleged spying for China. The case is concerning due to their high profile. Hsia previously commanded a destroyer and was deputy director of the Navy Command Headquarters’ Political Warfare Department. The two had access to sensitive information and have contacts in positions of influence.
There have been several high-profile spy cases in the past few years, affecting public and military morale. The High Court on May 13 last year acquitted New Party member Wang Ping-chung (王炳忠) and others who were accused of receiving funding from entities controlled by the Chinese military for the purpose of spreading Beijing’s propaganda. Taipei prosecutor Lin Da (林達) and Taiwan Forever Society chairman Huang Di-ying (黃帝穎) at the time criticized the acquittal, saying that “judicial officials and legislation have not kept up” with China’s disinformation campaigns.
In June, a retired major general surnamed Chien (錢) and a retired lieutenant colonel surnamed Wei (魏) were charged with helping Beijing create a spy network among active-duty service members. In November, the Kaohsiung District Prosecutors’ Office charged former army colonel Hsiang Te-en (向德恩) with corruption, accusing him of pledging allegiance to China and accepting money to work as a spy. The Ministry of National Defense at the time said it would “continue to bolster counterespionage education for officers, as well as rank-and-file soldiers, and would work closely with national security agencies to thwart Chinese intelligence-gathering efforts.”
The prevalence of such cases shows not enough is being done to combat espionage, particularly in the military. Following Hsiang’s case, Institute of National Defense and Security Research fellow Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲) said military espionage poses a serious threat to national security and urged the government to reinstate military trials or to have military prosecutors participate in espionage investigations.
This could be a good approach, as punishments for espionage are much harsher under the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces (陸海空軍刑法), but the government should also look at cutting off such activity before it can occur in the first place. For it to occur, two conditions must be met: Contact between Taiwanese officials and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agents must be established, and an exchange of money and information must take place. Ensuring that no such contacts take place would require prohibiting active-duty and recently retired military and political officials from traveling to China, scrutinizing and monitoring their travel and boosting the National Security Bureau’s means to monitor the movements and exchanges of Chinese in Taiwan.
Cutting off money and information exchanges would require that bank accounts of those with access to sensitive information be audited, and any large, atypical transfers or deposits be investigated. Information access should also be compartmentalized, with officials having access only to the information they need to perform their duties. Active-duty service members’ online and telephone communications with Chinese should also be monitored. Some people might say the measures would run against personal freedom, but anyone who chooses a career in politics or the military should know that positions in these fields, especially decisionmaking roles and positions with access to sensitive information, come with restrictions to protect national security.
Taiwan is in the process of reforming its military. This involves longer conscription terms, investment in the domestic development of defense systems and measures to boost professionalism. These are all good measures, but they would be for nothing if spying is not addressed.
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