Although Taiwan and the UK have no military cooperation, London has been closely monitoring the situation in the Taiwan Strait in the face of the aggressive expansion of Chinese Communist Party forces in the Indo-Pacific region. There is strategic space for military exchanges between Taiwan and the UK, and for the two nations to collaborate on maintaining security and stability in the region.
On Nov. 29, a British parliamentary delegation visited Taiwan. On Dec. 5, British Defence Select Committee Chairman Tobias Ellwood said in a Reuters report that the UK should have greater military and security interaction with Taiwan, and it should be bolder in supporting Taiwan internationally.
“There is much to explore” in boosting military help for Taiwan, he said, adding that during his visit to Taipei, they discussed Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program.
“Britain has stepped forward, more so than other nations, in helping Ukraine. Other nations then followed. There should be nothing preventing us from doing the same again with Taiwan,” he said.
Ellwood’s remarks are meaningful and deserve attention from Taiwan’s top security officials. A senior member of the Conservative Party, he served as the undersecretary of state for defence veterans, reserves and personnel from 2017 to 2019. He not only has an in-depth understanding of the global military situation, but also has considerable influence on the government.
With the US conducting “freedom of navigation” missions in the South China Sea in the past few years, the UK has started to attach importance to global security issues such as Chinese military expansion and cross-strait tensions. The UK has not only sided with the US on these issues, but has also taken military and diplomatic action.
In 2018, Royal Navy warships sailed through the South China Sea for the first time. In March last year, the UK published the Integrated Review 2021: The Defence Tilt to the Indo-Pacific. In July, the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group entered the South China Sea as part of a “freedom of navigation” exercise.
In September last year, Australia, the UK and the US established the AUKUS security alliance, sending a serious warning to Beijing about its military expansion in the South China Sea and its provocations against Taiwan.
When attending a NATO meeting in October last year, British Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace condemned China’s military intrusions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone as a dangerous act that threatened regional stability.
More recently, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and top British officials have repeatedly and openly emphasized that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are crucial to peace in the Indo-Pacific region. They have also expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. This shows that the UK values Taiwan’s international status and the construction of a safe Strait and region.
The Economist last year called Taiwan “the most dangerous place on Earth,” and many countries have said that a cross-strait war could occur any time. These have added to concerns in the UK about China changing the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and its threat to global security.
Taiwan and the UK share common values such as freedom, the rule of law and human rights, not to mention a considerable degree of trade interaction. The two countries should seize such strategic opportunities and use “parliamentary diplomacy” to help expand military collaboration, such as intelligence sharing, defense think tank cooperation, submarine development technology, and disinformation and cyberattacks.
Yao Chung-yuan is a professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s strategic planning department.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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