Tseng Sheng-kuang (曾聖光) died fighting in Ukraine on Wednesday last week. Some questioned why he had not stayed here and readied himself to defend Taiwan against a potential invasion by China.
Fighting against the tyranny of aggressive autocracies invading a sovereign nation resonates with Taiwan’s own predicament, on both moral and practical levels. The war in Ukraine is widely seen as a testing ground for the success or failure of a smaller state defending itself against a far larger one, under the conditions of modern warfare and with the support of powerful allies.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), his advisers and his generals will be scrutinizing events in Ukraine. Helping Ukraine win against Russia is one path to preventing war from breaking out across the Taiwan Strait.
Observers overseas might be confused about the apparent lack of consensus within Taiwan about Taiwan’s relationship to China. Even understanding how Taiwan relates to the Republic of China requires a nuanced understanding of complex political, ideological and historical factors. They might also be scratching their heads about the apparent lack, albeit increasing, of a sense of urgency among Taiwanese about the prospect of war.
Just as Taiwan’s allies will be monitoring the sense of urgency among its populace, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi will be watching to see how long Ukraine’s allies’ resolve lasts in funding billions of US dollars over the long term.
Xi might not want to risk all to take Taiwan at this juncture. Having just started his new term, and with the other challenges the Chinese economy is facing, he would do better to plot a more steady course, but he has surrounded himself with “yes-men,” so there is no saying what information he is being fed.
However, Xi will be drawing lessons about the impact of the war and sanctions on Putin’s regime, and what these all mean for Putin’s fate as the leader of his nation.
Winter is coming, and millions of people in the northern hemisphere will be left without heating, either through global energy shortages caused by the war, having their energy supplies cut off or, in Ukraine’s case, through the destruction of critical infrastructure. High inflation is also causing economic hardship for voters in the countries of the governments financing the war effort.
Whether Ukraine’s allies maintain their resolve and unity in the dark months ahead is crucial to Kyiv’s chances — and to the conclusions that Xi and his generals might draw. If Putin can wait out the winter, time might still be on his side come next spring.
There are concerns that if the Republican Party gains the US House of Representatives, support for Ukraine would wane. The truth is probably more nuanced. US Representative Kevin McCarthy, who is widely expected to take over the speakership if the Republicans win a majority, has said that the US should not be giving Ukraine “a blank check.” That does not mean the support would end; it might mean that the US would look to others, including the EU, to foot more of the bill.
European countries have their own problems to address, including inflation, the energy crisis and the prospect of war spilling over into their lands. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have real cause for concern.
The argument that a Ukrainian victory is imperative for European security is relatively simple to make, yet nevertheless still needs to be won over the long term. The argument that Western countries should also be diverting some attention and resources at this critical moment to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait is less easy to make.
Who knows what actually motivated Tseng to fight for Ukraine? However, a case can be made that his instincts were right, for both moral and practical reasons.
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