The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th National Congress came to a close over the weekend with the naming of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) as party leader for a third five-year term and the announcement of a new seven-member Central Politburo Standing Committee, cementing Xi’s iron grip on power.
Gone are any ideological challenges to “Xi Jinping thought.” The decimation of Xi’s rival Communist Youth League faction was dramatized by the forcible removal on Saturday of former Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) from his seat beside Xi in full view of reporters who had just been welcomed into the hall. The premiership vacated by Li Keqiang (李克強) — who was not even named to the 200-member Central Committee — is to be filled by Xi’s close ally Shanghai CCP Secretary Li Qiang (李強), despite his spotty track record leading the city’s COVID-19 response.
Precedent-breaking as Xi’s consolidation of power is, it is unlikely to be the last as Xi and his acolytes replace the institutions his forebears assiduously built with sycophancy. Without precedent to consult, it will be harder than ever to predict the vicissitudes of the CCP, which are now the domain of a single man.
For Taiwan, there is a valid fear that this will make an already precarious situation worse. China’s designs on Taiwan are clear, but the proverbial devil is in the details. Without any checks on Xi’s whims, it is conceivable that he could order an invasion or other dramatic action against Taiwan, whether advisable or not. This has already played out in Russia: The determination of its despotic ruler is unstoppable while seeming inconceivable from outside the Kremlin’s walls.
There are many reasons to believe the CCP would adopt an even harder stance on Taiwan. A new addition to the party constitution states that the CCP is committed to “resolutely opposing and deterring separatists seeking ‘Taiwan independence.’” The tone is markedly different from its previous congress in 2017, which called for strengthening a sense of unity among ethnic Chinese to facilitate national unification in accordance with the “one country, two systems” formula. Also conspicuously absent was the long-standing assertion of successive party congresses that “peace and development remain themes of the era,” replaced by Xi’s blustery warning of “dangerous storms” on the horizon. Although the kind of storm is unclear, it does not bode well for stability that Xi seems to be priming the country and party for strife.
That said, these changes do not necessarily portend immediate danger to Taiwan. Some version of stability could be expected in the short term as Xi — secure in his position and set for a lifetime in power — pushes his goals forward incrementally. This approach precludes dramatic military action against Taiwan, although increased pressure should be expected as Xi seeks to lay the groundwork for eventual unification.
More concerning is what might happen when Xi runs out of time. Now aged 69, he can afford to play the long game, but history is littered with examples of disarray in an absolute ruler’s waning days. Russia provides only the latest example, with its reportedly reclusive and aging president making a choice that serves his legacy more than the country. In China, fear of another chaotic succession is valid, as memories of Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) fanatic grip on power have not yet faded.
It is clear that Xi wants Taiwan’s unification to be part of his legacy; if he feels like time is running short, whether due to his health or a challenge to his power, it would not bode well for Taiwan.
With each passing day, the threat of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) assault on Taiwan grows. Whatever one’s view about the history, there is essentially no question that a PRC conquest of Taiwan would mark the end of the autonomy and freedom enjoyed by the island’s 23 million people. Simply put, the PRC threat to Taiwan is genuinely existential for a free, democratic and autonomous Taiwan. Yet one might not know it from looking at Taiwan. For an island facing a threat so acute, lethal and imminent, Taiwan is showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses.
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I still remember the first time I heard about the possibility of an invasion by China. I was six years old. I thought war was coming and hid in my bed, scared. After 18 years, the invasion news tastes like a sandwich I eat every morning. As a Gen Z Taiwanese student who has witnessed China’s harassment for more than 20 years, I want to share my opinion on China. Every generation goes through different events. I have seen not only the norms of China’s constant presence, but also the Sunflower movement, wars and people fighting over peace or equality,