On Tuesday last week, I was invited by my alma mater, Claremont Graduate School, to give a one-hour talk on US-China relations. Many students from master’s and doctoral programs attended. My graduate schoolmates, my dissertation advisers and my colleagues at California State University were also there.
In the follow-up discussion, most people in the audience said that Taiwan is not prepared for a potential military attack by China. They were also uncertain about Taiwan’s readiness to cope with attacks by the Chinese Communist Party. The option of “keeping the status quo” no longer exists and has not for some time, they said.
All things considered, the US should acknowledge this reality and Taiwan should reach a compromise with China before it is too late, they said.
Regrettably, I was not able to refute them on the spot.
They also found my deterrence theory problematic. Strategic deterrence is not easy to carry out, because the enemy would see every act as a provocation, they said.
If Taiwan lacks firm resolve, the strategy would bring it to a more perilous circumstance. Moreover, should Taiwan’s mandatory military service remain the same — that is, without being extended to two years — the situation would become even worse.
As the saying goes, “sending common people to war untrained is to throw them away.”
Later that night, I talked with a friend from Taiwan about what the audience said. My friend believed that those academics, most of whom are based in California, thought that way because economically, California depends on the China market.
While I find their attitude unhealthy, I do not think those US academics are biased. Their opinions are based entirely on their academic viewpoints. They might be wrong, but they are already tenured professors. Why would they care about who gets what and how?
Earlier this month, former chief of the general staff admiral Lee Hsi-ming (李喜明) was interviewed by CBS’ 60 Minutes. Not only did he call out for Taiwan to focus on arming itself to deter China, he was also concerned about whether Taiwanese would be prepared for war if one were to happen earlier than anticipated.
My colleagues said that if Taiwan is not — and will not — be ready, Taiwan and the US must think seriously about other solutions.
In the worst-case scenario, Taiwan would be not well prepared and China would not be deterred. The result is China, the US and Taiwan would have to bear the consequences.
Out of love for my motherland, Taiwan, I am extremely concerned.
I have said in previous essays that the future of Taiwan should be determined by the people of Taiwan, and my colleagues understand that they do not have a right to speak for Taiwan.
However, it is important to understand what those on the sidelines think.
They think that once China attacks, it does not matter how long Taiwan can hold out. What is important is demonstrating a powerful will to fight and prevent a war from happening. That is the spirit of deterrence: “It is deterrence, stupid.”
If we wait until war breaks out, it would be too late.
The strategy of deterrence has been greatly misunderstood in Taiwan. In colloquial terms, deterrence is not about self-assurance. It is more than believing in ourselves, more than claiming that we would fight the enemy at any cost. Deterrence is to realize that there is no going back, to display our strength, so that the intruders are deterred.
If our allies are unsure about our determination, how can we talk about deterring the enemy?
I do not have a right to speak on behalf of the people of Taiwan. Instead, I offer my observation from the perspective of a third party, as an honest and sincere friend.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton.
Translated by Liu Yi-hung
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