As news of the Ukrainian military’s success against Russian occupying forces trickles in, the old adage of “tell me who your friends are, and I will tell you who you are” is getting an update for contemporary world politics.
It appears that the quality and resolve of a country’s international friends could make the difference in whether it stands a chance against a great power bully. That great powers behave like bullies on the world stage is hardly surprising — some might even argue that such behavior is a feature of their international identity.
For this reason, small states have long been establishing various hedging and bandwagoning strategies to ensure their security and survival.
However, the situation in Ukraine seems to add a few new wrinkles that have a direct bearing on Taiwan and its relations with China. Namely, small states might have a few trump cards up their sleeves depending on who they develop as allies.
Taiwan is accustomed to China’s regular bullying tactics. Yet, even by the poor standards of cross-strait relations, Beijing’s attempts to blockade the island in the wake of US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei was unprecedented.
For nearly three days last month, China conducted aggressive military drills that clearly demonstrated its preparedness to claim Taiwan. This show of force also seemed to indicate that apart from symbolic gestures and statements, Taiwan’s partners chose to keep a low profile. For instance, while Washington sent the USS Ronald Reagan near Taiwan, the supercarrier was ordered not to enter the Taiwan Strait — unlike developments during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis more than 25 years ago.
Paradoxically, it was small countries on the opposite side of the world that seemed to challenge Beijing more assertively. The Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia have withdrawn from the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries — better known as the “16+1” — joining their neighbor Lithuania, which left the cooperation platform a year earlier.
Estonia’s and Latvia’s coordinated move was timed to indicate that Taiwan is not alone — and they are far from the only central and east European countries to challenge Beijing’s red lines.
It could be argued that Pelosi’s whirlwind trip was all but a shadow of the visit by Czech Senate President Milos Vystrcil, the second-highest-ranking elected official in the Czech Republic, who in August 2020 proclaimed: “I am Taiwanese” (in a statement echoing former US president John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech).
There are two key takeaways for Taiwan from the latest round of great power saber-rattling.
First, it seems that norms still do matter to the foreign policies of a number of small states — especially when they engage in geopolitical grandstanding. Estonia and Latvia, as well as Lithuania before them, have emphasized their identity as democratic states that object to oppression and human rights abuses.
It seems that the “spirit of 1989” still frames the foreign policy horizon of a number of central and east European countries, and has been a crucial factor in their willingness to challenge Beijing.
Although they are small, they have the capacity to influence the behavior of their much larger EU and NATO partners by reminding them that sticking to one’s principles is the best way to uphold one’s national interests, not to mention that it also makes business sense as well as for good foreign policy.
As former German vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel acknowledged in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: “We simply didn’t listen to eastern Europeans.”
Secondly, it is alliances rather than self-help that matters. While Ukraine has been able to withstand six months of Russian aggression owing to the resilience, spirit and resolve of its population, if it were not for the ongoing assistance of its partners — especially, its central and east European neighbors — it would have had a much harder time pushing back Russian troops.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are among the top five contributing nations to Ukraine according to their GDP. Of the top 10 donor countries, six are from the central and east European region. The alliance system is still what sets the West apart from other great powers. The only way powers such as Russia and China can get others to support them is by bullying or bribing.
If Taiwan can learn anything from the current state of international affairs, it is that it needs to develop meaningful allies with like-minded countries. The small central and east European states — just like Ukraine — are challenging great powers such as Russia and China, not merely on the strength of their principles, but with the knowledge that they have no shortage of friends willing to come to their aid.
At the same time, the conflict in Ukraine indicates that the small central and east European countries can be reliable partners when the going gets tough. The question is — can Taiwan develop such friends?
Emilian Kavalski is NAWA chair professor of complex systems at the Centre for International Studies and Development at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. Liu Tai-ting is an assistant professor at National Chung Hsing University’s Graduate Institute of International Politics.
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