The US’ Taiwan policy act on Sept. 14 was approved by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 17 to 5. The administration of US President Joe Biden has kept a close eye on its progress before it enters the US Congress for a vote.
The act was approved with slight modifications, reflecting a compromise between the US legislative and executive branches, and the final version released by the committee likely adheres to the stance of the Biden administration, as well as Democratic and Republican Party positions.
The smooth completion of its lawmaking process is just a matter of time.
When the act was made public, pro-unification voices in Taiwan came out to smear and slander it. Some tried to deceive fellow Taiwanese with intentional mistranslations, some misinterpreted the US’ intention to defend Taiwan, while others tried to imply that the act reflects only the will of the US Senate rather than the US government.
However, as deceptive as these fallacies might be, they cannot change an established US strategy that has long been determined.
If passed, the act would require the US Department of Defense to submit an annual Taiwan defense report on the premise of a “denial strategy.”
There is a fundamental difference between “denial” and “deterrence.” The US’ strategy to prevent China from attacking Taiwan has shifted from deterrence to denial, and the Taiwan policy act would only formalize what is already an implicit strategy.
Deterrence is to use strength and power to prevent an adversary from taking a desired action. Under a denial strategy, the US would continue to assist Taiwan in improving its self-defense capabilities.
The act says that the US would provide military assistance at no cost to help Taiwan develop asymmetric combat capabilities and enhance Taiwan’s international status.
The intention is to make it increasingly difficult for China to threaten Taiwan so that it will cease trying. This is also the reason Biden has said four times that the US would defend Taiwan if attacked.
During his visit to Japan in May, Biden said that he would be willing to use force to defend Taiwan, which many interpreted as a gaffe.
However, as he has continued to state the same point, it is obvious that what he said in Japan was no slip of the tongue. Biden intends to make the denial strategy clear.
The latest example came during an interview on the 60 Minutes television program aired on Sept. 15.
When asked if US forces would defend Taiwan against an attack, Biden firmly replied: “Yes.”
The US has learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that making it clear that aggression is not tolerated is the best way to avoid war and maintain peace. Facing China’s intention to attack Taiwan, the US has come to realize that the vague strategy of the past could no longer work. It must clearly make China understand that if it makes reckless moves against Taiwan, the US would send troops to defend it.
Taiwan should certainly be self-reliant as well. With the help of the US military, Taiwan should more actively strengthen its combat capabilities and strive to improve its international status.
Some Taiwanese interpreted Biden’s remarks on 60 Minutes as not supporting Taiwanese independence.
“Taiwan makes their own judgements about their independence,” Biden said.
Based on the principle of national self-determination, Taiwan’s independence requires Taiwanese to express their will, which is not for the US to do.
“That’s their decision,” Biden said, showing respect for Taiwanese.
Now, Taiwanese should consider that it is time to show the will to assert self-determination.
Tommy Lin is director of Wu Fu Eye Clinic and president of the Formosa Republican Association.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,
RSS