The United States may soon find it somewhere between difficult and near impossible to maintain a sufficiently favorable balance of power against the People’s Republic of China in the Western Pacific. That is, unless our leaders in Washington can evaluate past policy decisions with a critical eye and begin to integrate Taiwan into an overarching plan to maintain regional stability. For its part, Taiwan simply cannot ensure its long-term survival unless it is able to obtain a greater degree of support from America. War and peace in the Taiwan Strait will likely turn on whether or not Washington and Taipei can act with alacrity to improve their overall bilateral political and military relationship.
Progress undoubtedly can be made, with a bit of diplomatic ingenuity, while maintaining a formal and official relationship that does not involve the reestablishment of a named US embassy in Taiwan (the AIT compound in Taipei is already an embassy in all but name). Achieving overt government-to-government relations should be the ultimate goal. It is strategically unsound and morally indefensible for America not to diplomatically recognize a fellow democracy in perpetuity. Taiwan ranks among the top ten democratic countries in the world and deserves to be treated with respect and dignity.
Ideals, of course, oftentimes must be tempered with pragmatism. It seems imperative to evolve policy in a steady and thoughtful fashion to avoid destabilizing countermoves from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet, it is absurd to think that young American lives could soon be lost in defense of a country that the US State Department pretends is not a real country. Our men and women in uniform deserve clarity. They deserve to know what they are training for, who they will be fighting alongside, and why Taiwan’s freedom matters to their own.
In the months and years ahead, Washington should focus on new initiatives which reflect the objective reality that the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) exists as a free and sovereign state. Since 1979, the most tangible manifestation of Taiwan’s international political legitimacy has been American arms sales. However, since 2006, the US has developed a pattern of freezing arms sales for long periods of time and releasing them in one-time packages or “bundles” out of deference to Beijing.
Multiple administrations (including that of President Joe Biden) have bought into the false narrative that frequent, high-quality arms sales are too provocative to Beijing. This policy has damaged America’s credibility as a steadfast security partner. It has undermined any potential Taiwanese negotiating position with the CCP. It has rewarded Xi Jinping’s (習近平) coercion and hostility, rather than punishing him and reassuring the Taiwanese people.
It would be unwise for the US-Taiwan military and security relationship to continue being so heavily dependent upon arms sales alone. Resiliency in any relationship is not found by creating single points of failure. President Biden and his top advisors should conduct regular exchanges with their Taiwanese counterparts, on the phone and in person. Taiwanese officials should be invited to openly participate in activities such as international defense events and deliberations over shared global concerns.
US military commanders, especially those at the four-star rank with significant joint experience, should regularly visit Taiwan from the Pentagon, Indo-Pacific Command, and Seventh Fleet. In a crisis, it will be imperative that they are able to provide the White House with military judgments that are informed by actual knowledge of the local terrain. The highest-ranking US defense official serving in Taiwan should be a general, not a colonel.
Other efforts to demonstrate support for Taiwan’s government are possible and would be important components of a closer relationship. Reciprocal ship visits, bilateral exercises, and defense industrial cooperation should all be positively considered. Taiwan’s capable military should be allowed to work side-by-side with US forces in conducting humanitarian and disaster relief missions. Taiwan played a vital role in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic amidst Beijing’s coverups and predatory mask diplomacy. Much more can and should be done to make sure that Taiwan’s future efforts are closely coordinated with those of the US government and military.
It is now clear that Beijing will never accept Taiwan’s liberty and allow it to enjoy the international position in the world it deserves. The CCP has shown it will not hesitate to use every tool at its disposal, including economic links, cultural exchanges, and even disease, to undermine Taiwan’s government. The strongest and most enduring friend Taiwan has is the United States. Yet closer political ties are needed.
Rather than invade, China could opt to engage in a war of nerves that plays out over the course of years or even decades. This should be considered more probable than invasion, especially if the correlation of forces continues to confront Chinese leaders with the prospect of a prohibitively costly and uncertain war. American strategists should do more to prepare for the worst case, while using all instruments of national power to prevent conflict and secure a brighter future in Asia. That begins with revisiting and reforming our Taiwan policy.
Ian Easton is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute.
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