Vice President William Lai’s (賴清德) lightning visit to Japan to offer his condolences following the assassination of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe had the Japanese media lauding the gesture by the person they called “Taiwan’s pro-Japan second-in-command.”
Given the special circumstances of the visit, Lai was accorded far better treatment than was given to former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who made a stopover in Japan on his way to the US in 1985.
The administration of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is clearly unafraid of angering Beijing; that it extended a welcoming hand to Taiwan’s vice president speaks volumes.
Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) commands a majority in parliament and would not face another election for three years. With Abe’s passing, Kishida no longer has a powerful challenger to his authority.
Naturally, stimulating the economy would be a priority, and in this he cannot afford to disregard the Chinese market. Sept. 29 will mark the 50th anniversary of the normalization of Japan’s diplomatic relations with China, which would be a good opportunity for the two countries to improve relations.
UNFAVORABLE VIEW
That said, according to a poll released this month, 87 percent of Japanese view China unfavorably, and the LDP’s resounding victory on July 10 shows that Japanese want the Kishida administration to continue Abe’s policy of being pro-US and friendly toward Taiwan, while opposing China.
Under the watchful eye of a Japanese public deeply suspicious of China and friendly toward Taiwan, Kishida is going to have play a balancing act between rapprochement with Beijing and nurturing friendly relations with Taipei.
By allowing Lai’s visit he assuaged the concerns of conservatives, but also left a way open to break the ice with Beijing, with less background noise complicating matters.
The nature of Lai’s visit makes it difficult for Beijing to protest in any reasonable way, as offering condolences in such circumstances is only humane. In addition, China has found itself isolated, and this opportunity to explore ways to improve relations with Japan in the immediate “post-Abe” era should not be passed up for a trivial matter such as bemoaning Lai’s visit.
However, with the passing of Lee and Abe, people have lost two major advocates of maintaining friendly Taiwan-Japan relations.
Kishida might well want to step out of Abe’s shadow. Personnel choices, from appointing the pro-China Yoshimasa Hayashi, regarded as a political rival of Abe, as his minister of foreign affairs, to the sudden departure of former administrative vice defense minister Kazuhisa Shimada, a figure close to Abe, have signaled that change is in the air.
Since he served as Tainan mayor, Lai has been the most prolific Taiwanese politician in terms of cultivating ties with Japan, sowing seeds of friendship wherever he went. He knows the country well, and is well-known among Japanese politicians.
For the Kishida administration to welcome Lai and allow him to attend Abe’s funeral in the capacity of a close friend is a positive sign for President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and her vice president.
It sends a clear signal that, even if Kishida is willing to improve ties with China, he also intends to continue Abe’s approach of being pro-US and friendly toward Taiwan.
Wang Hui-sheng is chief director of the Kisei Ladies’ and Children’s Hospital in Japan.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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