The National Communications Commission (NCC) on June 29 proposed a draft digital services intermediary act, which would establish special provisions for platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and DCard. Although the move has been criticized by opposition parties as restricting freedom of speech, this is actually not the case.
The draft law is largely based on the EU’s Digital Services Act, with the purpose of protecting users’ rights and requiring technology platforms to implement a self-discipline mechanism and improve transparency.
Whether during election and campaign periods, or since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a lot of fake news on the Internet, spreading confusion and panic. Most of the fake news items are obviously part of cognitive warfare conducted by Chinese cyberarmies, aiming to disrupt Taiwan’s elections or interfere with its control of the pandemic.
Therefore, this bill is necessary.
Facebook’s unreasonable censorship should also be targeted by the bill. Media reports have said that even though Chinese citizens are legally prohibited from using Facebook, Chinese are the ones responsible for censoring Taiwanese posts.
The reach of remarks that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not like — such as posts mentioning Hong Kong’s anti-extradition movement or supporting Hong Kong — is often reduced, resulting in particularly low visibility.
Words that the CCP does not like, such as “武漢肺炎” (Wuhan pneumonia) etc, may even be categorized as contravening the code of conduct and the author banned from posting.
On the other hand, many fake accounts in simplified Chinese that spam pornographic posts are often categorized as not in contravention of the rules even if they are reported, showing that Facebook’s censorship system is problematic.
Taiwan and China are obviously different countries, why should Taiwan’s posts be censored by people from another country, especially Chinese who grew up without freedom of speech?
Taiwan is one of the heavy users of Facebook. The platform makes a lot of money in Taiwan, but it makes Taiwanese users subject to China, which is hardly reasonable. Large-scale online platforms can easily become a vulnerability, enabling totalitarian countries to use democracy to oppose democracy.
It is important that the NCC follow in the footsteps of the EU’s Digital Services Act and require these platforms to be open and transparent.
As a democratic country, Taiwan should use auld digital services intermediary act to require Facebook to set up Taiwan’s own censorship team to prevent the platform from serving the CCP.
Pan Kuan was a participant in the Sunflower movement.
Translated by Lin Lee-Kai
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