The Stalking and Harassment Prevention Act (跟蹤騷擾防制法), which came into force on Wednesday last week, should come as a blessing to many women.
However, more important is to properly implement gender equality education. That would highlight the intent of the law and prevent it from needlessly falling by the wayside.
Young people, especially adolescent teenagers, tend to fantasize about the opposite sex and often feel the urge to pursue the objects of their desire. If the rules listed in the act are too strict, it could prevent young people from taking the initiative in this pursuit, or even get in the way of their normal interactions.
This is likely not the result that parents and schools would like to see.
We should teach students more about showing respect between genders so that they can honor each other from the bottom of their hearts. They would then be less likely to act in ways that might hurt each other, enabling them to get to know each other in a mutually acceptable context.
Only if the Stalking and Harassment Prevention Act goes hand in hand with gender equality education can it be implemented to its intended effect. That would really be a win-win situation.
Li Kuan-long is a lecturer at Shih Chien University’s Kaohsiung campus.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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