If any of Xi Jinping’s (習近平) biographies are to be believed, the paramount leader has never been as popular with women as you might think. In fact, he’s been treated pretty roughly by the fairer sex his whole life, and it has probably traumatized him.
This may account for why he sometimes appears overeager to show off his strong, masculine traits. Few world leaders choose to spend as much time as Xi dressed in camouflage, visiting the troops, and presiding over massive military parades. Under his leadership, China is undergoing a remarkable nuclear weapons buildup and doing a ridiculous amount of saber-rattling against Taiwan.
While speculative, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy might be a sign that its ruler suffers from a tragic inferiority complex. All the warning signs are there. Xi is unusually aggressive, insecure, and uncomfortable comparing himself with others (like Winnie-the-Pooh). Objectively speaking, Xi is an accomplished and powerful man. He has nothing to be ashamed of (other than his manifold crimes against humanity), but he apparently feels wholly inadequate on the world stage. To better understand why, let’s look at all the relationship disappointments he’s had to deal with.
You see, Xi’s mother, Qi Xin (齊心), ignored him as a child. Her job at the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School demanded almost all her time. Xi was raised mainly by his stay-at-home dad, Xi Zhongxun (習仲勛), who was probably not the best role model a boy could have. When Xi’s dad was a teenager, he was convicted of attempted murder. He spent much of his life in and out of jail.
During the chaos and terror of the “cultural revolution,” Xi Jinping’s eldest half-sister, Xi Heping (習和平), died a violent death. Making matters worse, Xi’s mom publicly disowned him. He was a tender fifteen when it happened and undoubtedly very hurt.
Xi Jinping’s first wife, Ke Lingling (柯玲玲), divorced him after three years of marriage and moved to London. It must have been a humiliating experience to be dumped like that.
Five years later, Xi married his second and current wife, Peng Liyuan (彭麗媛). They enjoyed a four-day honeymoon in Xiamen, and then she went on a long singing tour. They lived apart for the next 20 years, separated at times by a 48-hour-long train ride between his posts in the south and her apartment in Beijing.
In June 1989, Peng serenaded the troops after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. A singer-soldier, she spent a lot of time visiting PLA bases and performing for her adoring fans. It seems reasonable to assume Xi didn’t relish the thought of his wife hanging out with so many other men.
Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze (習明澤), grew up far away from him. She later put even more distance between herself and Big Daddy Xi by studying at some expensive school in Boston, a decision sure to have stressed him out. Just think of all those missed birthdays — and those tuition payments!
Xi’s been having trouble with the ladies at the office too. Not one woman has deigned to join the elite inner circle around him in the Politburo Standing Committee. Is it his strong cologne or aftershave? Women have also turned up their noses at all but one of the seats on his twenty-five-member Central Political Bureau.
The only woman in Xi’s orbit is Sun Chunlan (孫春蘭), and she has a track record of taking credit for his work. In early 2022, Sun was awarded the prestigious Gold Olympic Order for managing Covid-19 during the Beijing winter games. That award clearly should have gone to Mr. Covid Zero himself.
It gets worse. According to Erin Hale, only three percent of provincial-level leaders in China are women, and the ladies occupy less than ten percent of the seats at the National People’s Congress. Despite Xi’s attempts to recruit them, young women are refusing to come to his Party. Female CCP membership has dropped down to 25 percent, a depressing ratio for any Party builder.
Part of the problem is that the women of China’s benevolent one-party dictatorship are upset with the perks that Xi has given them. Thanks to him, white-collar women workers are allowed (read: required) to retire when they are a mere 55 years old. Blue-collar women laborers have it even better. They get to call it quits at age 50 and enjoy a long retirement. This forces Xi, who turns 69 this June, to work overtime with his bros to hold up the sky in their absence.
Then there’s those “troublemaking” feminist and women’s rights groups — along with the now missing Peng Shuai (彭帥) and MeToo movement in China. Instead of appreciating their Commander-in-Chief’s attempts to bring back traditional family values, many women accuse him of making it more difficult for them to file for divorce when their husbands beat them. Others want justice when shady officials like Zhang Gaoli (張高麗) sexually assault them.
While such concerns are entirely valid, what these women don’t seem to understand is how dedicated the Core Leader is to their comprehensive well-being. As Chairman of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, Xi knows the gender pay gap is widening fast across China. Today, there are fewer well-paid opportunities for women in the workplace than ever. So, when Xi tells the women of China to stay home and be good wives and have babies, he is just trying to protect them from professional disappointment and financial hardship.
Now we all know that General Secretary Xi is wise, charming, and charismatic. The fanatical cult of personality that has developed around him didn’t just happen by accident. He earned it. Those monstrous billboards on every city block don’t lie. It’s obvious that he has a raw animal magnetism. Just look at all the world leaders eager to have a close relationship with him (especially Vladimir Putin).
Yet, try as Xi might to win love, respect, and adulation, the ladies of China keep rejecting him.
It’s enough to drive a man insane.
Ian Easton is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute and author of the book, The Final Struggle: Inside China’s Global Strategy.
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