Tue, May 17, 2022 page8

• Lessons from sinking of ‘Moskva’

  • By Lu Li-shih 呂禮詩
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  Just as the cause of the Kursk submarine disaster remains shrouded in mystery — the nuclear-powered Russian submarine suffered an explosion during a naval exercise on Aug. 12, 2000, and sank, killing all 118 crew onboard — it is unlikely that we will ever get to the bottom of the sequence of events last month that led to the sinking of the Moskva guided missile cruiser, the flagship of the Russian navy’s Black Sea fleet. Ukraine claims it struck the vessel with two missiles, while Russia says ammunition onboard the ship exploded and the ship tipped over while being towed back to port.

  However, if one removes the multilayered defensive capabilities of the Moskva from the equation — its air defense, anti-missile and electronic warfare systems — and examines the battlespace using a tactical mindset, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of what might have occurred, and also predict the future direction of naval warfare.

  Ever since Moscow initiated its “special military operation” against Ukraine, the Moskva had been patrolling the Black Sea, on standby to provide an air defense umbrella to the amphibious taskforce waiting offshore from the port city of Odessa. In the final moments before the first missile struck, the Moskva was sailing on a course 24 nautical miles (44km) from Snake Island and 80 nautical miles from Odessa, in international waters.

  A Turkish-made Baykar Bayraktar TB2 uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV), operated by the Ukrainian military, was hovering at a high altitude to identify and then gain a fix on the Moskva. Meanwhile, a US Navy Boeing P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft, operating along the Romanian coast, was carrying out surveillance and reconaissance. Both of these assets presented a serious threat to the Moskva as they could provide the Ukrainian military’s shore-based Neptune anti-ship missile battery with precise location and targeting information.

  The Moskva was equipped with S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) long-range surface-to-air missiles, OSA-MA (SA-N-4 Gecko) SR S short-range surface-to-air missiles, the AK-630 close-in weapons system, as well as electronic protection and electronic attack systems.

  The Moskva appears to have been threatened with multiple, near-saturation-level air attacks, during the course of which the ship was hit by two Neptune missiles. The attack highlights the nature of modern warfare, which is increasingly defined by cross-platform attacks and all-domain gray zone conflicts.

  Although the Baykar Bayraktar UAV does not possess satellite link capability, it does have a tactical data link, which allowed for cross-platform communication with the P-8 Poseidon, Neptune anti-ship missile mobile units and the Ukrainian military’s southern command headquarters.

  This network of communications capability allows Ukraine’s military to carry out seamless “C5ISRT” (a US military acronym which stands for command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting). Interoperability with the militaries of NATO member nations and other international partners is a capability that has been carefully honed over more than a decade, through the Ukrainian military’s participation in annual naval exercises in the Black Sea, dubbed “Exercise Sea Breeze.”

  This integrated method of warfare was set out by US Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilda in the document Navigation Plan 2021, in which the ability to conduct “all-domain operations” was given significant weighting.

  The Ukrainian and US militaries’ exploitation of “gray zone” non-traditional, non-conventional force was in full play in the attack on the Moskva: the Baykar Bayraktar UAV and P-8 Poseidon were both flying in international waters, collecting intelligence, and conducting surveillance and reconnaissance. Although the Moskva’s radar was able to detect the presence of both aircraft, the ship’s crew might not have been able to immediately establish the nationality of the aircraft.

  To avoid mistakenly attacking a NATO aircraft and contravening Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which forbids the use of force against another UN member state, and to avoid invoking Article 51, which allows for “collective self-defense” should an attack occur against a UN member state, the ship’s captain would have had to constantly radio back to his superiors for instructions. It is possible to surmise that this is the main reason for the delayed anti-aircraft and anti-missile actions of the ship.

  The Ministry of National Defense’s modernization program for the military over the past few years has revolved around innovative asymmetric thinking. The ministry should draw several lessons from the Moskva’s sinking. First, it must consider how it could link together the platforms of each military branch to form a single integrated system. Second, it should explore the possibility of conducting regular “interoperability exercises” with the militaries of friendly countries, such as the US and Japan, so that the military would have the ability to mount an effective deterrence against the Chinese military by conducting “all-domain operations.”

  Lu Li-shih is a former instructor at the Republic of China Naval Academy and a former captain of the ROCS Hsin Chiang.

  Translated by Edward Jones
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