The US this week informed Taiwan it was delaying the sale of M109-A6 self-propelled guns, proposing to replace them with other weapons, while Taipei announced it was reconsidering buying MH-60R helicopters because they were too costly.
Although the two weapons systems are different in nature, they highlight that Taiwan’s military has not squarely faced the change of focus in US arms sales to it.
Given what is happening in Russia’s war in Ukraine, Washington has clearly redefined its arms sales to Taipei with a focus on assisting the development of “asymmetric capability.”
In an interview with Deutsche Welle in March, academic Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia program at the Washington-based German Marshall Fund, said she thinks that sometimes Taiwan’s military is just paying lip service when discussing asymmetric capability.
She added that some of the things Taiwan’s military does are focused on asymmetric capability, but they are not oriented toward that goal.
The change in focus of US arms sales to Taiwan is nothing new.
As early as September last year, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and National Security Council Secretary-General Wellington Koo (顧立雄) visited the US for the Taiwan-US Special Channel and the Monterey Talks, the tone was set after negotiations with US National Security Council Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell.
In her Deutsche Welle interview, Glaser reiterated the importance of developing Taiwan’s “asymmetric defense.” As a former consultant to the US Department of Defense and Department of State, and a former member of the China panel of the defense department’s Defense Policy Board, her advice at the think tank not only influences US policy, but also reflects US officials’ perceptions to a degree, so her comments should not be seen as just personal opinions.
It is a pity that Taiwan’s military has not taken her words seriously and seized the initiative to adjust its strategic deployment.
The military on Thursday said that it might cancel the “Eagle No. 3” proposal to procure 12 MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters from the US due to the high cost of the aircraft.
The helicopters are superior to Taiwan’s and they are powerful anti-submarine weapons.
However, if the advanced US helicopters are not equipped with encrypted communications systems, it would be meaningless to connect them to the navy’s warships, as they would not enhance anti-submarine capabilities without them.
If the deal were to proceed, Taiwan would need to procure the encrypted communications system, followed by an overall update of the combat systems on its warships, adding to the cost.
From the experience of Ukraine fighting off a Russian invasion, and as Taiwan’s defense budget is limited, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System multiple rocket launchers or precision-guided Harpoon missiles might be a better choice than the anti-submarine helicopters or self-propelled guns.
Which systems have greater “asymmetric capability” to deter a Chinese Communist Party invasion? The US attitude is clear.
The change in focus of US arms sales to Taiwan should not be limited to the adjustment of items, as the key lies in whether Taiwan is aware of, as well as willing to construct, the strategic thinking of “asymmetric capability” so it can effectively cooperate with the US and the democratic alliance against China.
Paul Lei is a senior journalist.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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