The Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) this month published a document titled: “Suggestions concerning the work of advancing ancient texts for a new era” (關於推進新時代古籍工作的意見) and required that all government departments and local administrations thoroughly implement the “suggestions.”
In addition to requiring that ancient texts be given new impetus through digitization, conservation, dissemination, research, compilation, talent cultivation, legal protection and financial support, most noteworthy was the document’s position that the purpose of elevating China’s ancient texts is to “provide a spiritual force for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
The document said that China’s ancient texts would be incorporated into the “overall national development project” and there would be a “systematic organization of core thinking and ideas from outstanding traditional Chinese culture” that would revolve around a robust “shared consciousness of the Chinese people” and “guide each ethnic group toward a correct historical perspective of the Chinese people.”
Historical materials and artifacts all contain an intrinsic artistic, literary, scientific and historic value — and collectively form a cultural resource that can never be reproduced. The work of those involved in the conservation and study of these cultural artifacts provide a deeper and more complete understanding of history, while also preserving the wisdom of previous generations, crystallized in a tangible form.
However, according to the CCP’s current thinking as outlined in the document, the role of historical materials and artifacts are to be in service to the party.
The CCP intends to unilaterally select historical texts that are useful to it and which can be pressed into action to inflate the Chinese public’s prejudiced nationalistic sensibility — a centripetal force to coalesce the public around the party.
By way of example, during the Cultural Revolution, many historical artifacts and remains were destroyed, Confucianism was roundly condemned, books were burned and whole libraries were eviscerated. These acts of wanton destruction became a lasting symbol of the Cultural Revolution.
However, in the past few years the CCP has begun to selectively incorporate and even esteem Confucian thought, and use the collective writings of ancient Confucian academics as a tool to furnish the party with legitimacy, solidify its grip on power, and fashion a docile and submissive populace.
Moreover, many historical texts are selected to build a “patriotic education base” — becoming the nuts and bolts of the party’s brainwashing curriculum that is spoon-fed to children and used to indoctrinate adults.
The CCP’s “patriotic education” is a form of selective history, which on the one hand magnifies the “brutalization of the Chinese people at the hands of foreign interlopers” — creating the image of a demonic external enemy in the minds of the people — and on the other hand selectively omits the atrocities and serious mistakes committed by successive CCP leaders.
The goal of the party’s “patriotic education” is to inculcate a nationalistic fervor among the Chinese populace and an anti-Western victimhood complex, while simultaneously strengthening the party’s legitimacy.
This is especially vital ahead of this year’s 20th party congress. In the lead up to the congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) prestige cannot be allowed to be damaged in any way.
Looking forward, in addition to promoting youth-based social activities and continuing to insert itself in the lives of Chinese youth — in literature, games, smartphone apps, music, art, calligraphy, dance, costume dramas and new media — the party’s domestic “patriotic education” will invariably also be directed at young Taiwanese and specific organizations that are focal points of Beijing’s “united front” strategy.
If the CCP’s propaganda organizations shake off their stereotyped style and stodgy prose to be more attractive to Taiwanese and imperceptibly instill a patriotic Chinese mindset, over the long term this could have a profound effect on sections of Taiwanese society. Taipei must stay alert to this omnipresent threat.
Kung Hsien-tai is director of the ethics department at Taiwan Financial Holdings.
Translated by Edward Jones
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