If Russian President Vladimir Putin is looking for approval for his invasion of Ukraine, he need look no further than the Chinese Internet. While the world overwhelmingly condemns Russia’s assault, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pushing for an alternative reality with pro-Russia, pro-Putin, pro-war propaganda on its social media platforms.
However, a group of Chinese dissidents is revealing to the world Beijing’s zealous support of Russia. Naming its social media campaign the Great Translation movement, the anonymous members created a Twitter account to collect messages containing pro-Russia sentiment from state-run China Central Television, Sina Weibo and WeChat, among others, and offer translations in languages including English, Japanese and Korean.
“One could argue that the [Bucha massacre] was staged. After all, [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskiy is an actor doing what actors are trained to do,” one translated message said.
“At the beginning of the war, Ukrainians pretended to be corpses falling to the ground with makeup. So I am not surprised about it,” another said.
Subscribers to the dissidents’ Twitter account are encouraged to participate in the campaign by forwarding or reposting the messages on the platform of their choice. A month after its creation, the account has attracted more than 100,000 followers.
The Great Translation Movement is significant, for it unveils the CCP’s pernicious narratives, offers non-Chinese speakers an opportunity to examine many ludicrous propaganda efforts and puts a spotlight on the outcomes of CCP messaging.
The CCP aims its propaganda to international and domestic audiences. To non-Chinese speakers in the West, China is a closed book, and any discourse issued by Beijing often portrays its government as a “benevolent” and “magnanimous” entity. For those who are not familiar with the darker side of Beijing’s state propaganda, they could be misled into believing disinformation composed of obfuscation, concealment and hyperbole.
The Great Translation Movement is popping a hole in that bubble. It is exposing the true colors of the CCP’s ideologies and narratives to a worldwide audience. As social media platforms are heavily censored in China, comments and discourses that are allowed to remain online either align with the party’s ideology or work in favor of the party’s image.
However, messages discussing “sheltering Ukrainian women,” “Putin the Great” and “Ukraine deserved to be invaded” shed light on the CCP’s nationalistic ideology and anti-US stances as Beijing denies providing assistance to Russia.
Such extreme statements disclose the hard truth that China’s cyberspace only allows voices that are approved by and supportive of the CCP, while “dissident” voices are erased. Many Chinese who disagree with their government cannot make their voices heard for fear of reprisal, turning the Chinese Internet into an echo chamber, a space where the CCP’s ideology is only praised, reinforced and disseminated.
The Great Translation Movement is exposing the dark side of the CCP. It can also serve to remind people of the highly manipulative nature of online information, and how it can affect matters closer to home.
Chinese-backed platforms were spreading propaganda in favor of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) during the 2020 presidential election. To prevent such efforts from being effective in November’s mayoral elections, Taiwanese should read between the lines and beware of pro-China sentiments embedded in social media messages.
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