National Security Bureau Director-General Chen Ming-tong (陳明通) has made two public appearances over the past week to answer questions from lawmakers, mostly about the Russia-Ukraine war and its implications for Taiwan.
During a meeting of the legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee on Monday, Chen said he believed the US would be “more deeply involved” in a war across the Taiwan Strait than in Ukraine, due to its commitments to Taipei under the US’ Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
“The current situation [in Ukraine] has given China much to think about, as the US has given much support to Ukraine, even without a law similar to the TRA,” he said.
The news media focused on these comments, which, if taken out of context, could mean that the government is counting on Washington to intervene militarily in a conflict between Taiwan and China.
However, the opposite is true.
Chen was responding to a lawmaker’s question about Chinese cognitive warfare operations, which have sought to cast US assistance to Ukraine as lackluster and sow the idea in the minds of Taiwanese that they would be “abandoned” to their fate by a “fickle Uncle Sam.”
Since the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, Chinese bots have flooded social media with posts such as: “Today Afghanistan, tomorrow Taiwan,” “Today Vietnam, tomorrow Taiwan” and, more recently, “Today Ukraine, tomorrow Taiwan.”
The intention behind such cognitive warfare is to create a sense of inevitability among Taiwanese — that there is no point in resisting China, so it would be better to sue for peace now rather than mount a futile resistance and suffer immense bloodshed while the US does nothing.
Cognitive warfare aims to gradually erode a person’s mental defenses and alter their perceptions without them being aware it is happening, which is why it is so dangerous and must be taken seriously.
Chen was probably seeking to rebut Chinese propaganda, and reassure lawmakers and the public that Washington is providing Kyiv with significant assistance, including detailed intelligence and vast quantities of weapons, and that it would likely do the same — if not more — for Taiwan under similar circumstances.
However, Chen was careful not to mention the prospect of direct military intervention. His assessment that Washington would likely be “more deeply involved” probably referred to enhanced intelligence sharing, shipments of sophisticated weaponry, economic sanctions and other forms of non-direct military assistance.
Moreover, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has repeatedly said the government’s national defense policy is centered around the concept of “defense self-reliance.” This means training and equipping the military to independently defend the nation against an attack and building a self-sustaining domestic defense industry, focused on supplying asymmetric warfare capabilities.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of National Defense is pursing a policy of “defense self-deterrence” — fielding a range of sophisticated medium-range, conventionally armed cruise missiles that can penetrate Chinese air defenses and strike deep into China.
The government and the military’s thinking on defense has for some time been predicated on the assumption that Taiwan cannot rely on the US or any other country coming to its rescue.
During questioning by lawmakers, Chen said that Ukraine’s resistance against a far larger and superior Russian force has greatly inspired Taiwan’s military and defense establishment. The government must strike while the iron is hot and use this moment to push through difficult reforms. It is time for Taiwan to stand on its own two feet.
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