Chinese state media on Saturday last week labeled two Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators as “secret Taiwanese independence advocates.”
The report in the People’s Political Consultative Daily said that KMT legislators Lin Wei-chou (林為洲) and Charles Chen (陳以信) colluded with external antagonists to act against China’s interests.
This has major implications for the KMT, and for its approach to Taiwan-China relations. The KMT has long defined itself through adherence to the idea of inevitable unification, the terms of which have been left intentionally ambiguous. A cornerstone of KMT rhetoric has been the so-called “1992 consensus,” through which the KMT said that it had a tacit agreement with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) about there being “one China,” with each side free to interpret the meaning in their own way.
China has traditionally also subscribed to the idea of “one China with different interpretations” — likely seeing the concept as a way to get the ball rolling on unification talks — and Beijing has pushed President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to also adhere to the idea. The KMT has leveraged this “consensus” by presenting itself as the party that could maintain friendly relations with China, and thus avoid a military invasion. The other advantage of “different interpretations” has been that the KMT could fence-sit, playing to its Taiwanese supporters’ sensibilities on the issue of Republic of China (ROC) sovereignty, while at the same time keeping China happy.
As China now appears to be equating ROC sovereignty claims by the KMT with ambitions for Taiwan’s formal independence, the KMT has lost its trump card, which relied on keeping details of “one China” ambiguous. The KMT has been backed into a corner and finds itself forced to either talk about unification under new terms (with ROC sovereignty being subjugated by the People’s Republic of China), or to abandon all talk of “unification,” which would require Beijing to recognize the ROC’s sovereignty over Taiwan as a prerequisite for any bilateral talks.
According to sources, Chinese academics are saying that under unification, Taiwan could retain powers of governance, but should be an entity without sovereignty, similar to Hong Kong and Macau. Meanwhile, Lin on Tuesday told reporters that “the ROC is a sovereign and independent nation, and if this is considered ‘Taiwanese independence,’ then it would describe the [desires of the] vast majority of Taiwanese.” Clearly the KMT sees the contradictions in “growing closer to the US and being more amicable with China,” which Chen on Tuesday said was the “path forward for the KMT.”
China’s suddenly tough stance on the KMT is somewhat confusing given that it has long used support for the KMT as a way to sow division in Taiwan. However, it could be that the CCP believes it can weed out KMT legislators it sees as more neutral on unification, while propping up those who are more hardline on the issue. It might also feel that allowing ambiguity on ROC sovereignty has made unclear its goal of unification by applying its “one country, two systems” formula to Taiwan. Despite clear evidence that the formula has failed in Hong Kong, and that both the KMT and DPP have rejected the application of such a formula to Taiwan, China continues to espouse the idea whenever it discusses unification.
By now it should be abundantly clear to the KMT that ROC sovereignty and unification with China are incompatible concepts, and the only way to protect the interests of Taiwanese is to focus more on protecting the nation’s sovereignty and less on relations with China. The KMT is running out of time to engage in some introspection and to reinvent itself.
Neither the “1992 consensus” nor “one country, two systems” has any place in Taiwan’s future, and the KMT and China must accept that.
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