Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Deputy Chairman Hsiao Hsu-tsen (蕭旭岑) earlier this month led a delegation to Beijing to attend a think tank forum between the KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After returning to Taiwan, Hsiao spoke at length about “accumulating mutual trust” and letting matters “fall into place,” portraying the forum as a series of discussions focused on cooperation in tourism, renewable energy, disaster prevention, emerging industries, health and medicine, and artificial intelligence (AI).
However, when the entire dialogue presupposes the so-called “1992 consensus — the idea that there is only “one China,” with each side of the Taiwan Strait having its own interpretation of what that means — and opposition to Taiwanese independence as its political premise, such exchanges lose any space for neutrality, instead becoming highly politicized institutional operations. Given that CCP authorities have publicly denied the existence of the Republic of China and have even threatened to “punish independence,” the KMT-CCP forum far exceeded the bounds of academic exchange, instead becoming part of a specific political agenda.
The issue is not in the cross-strait exchanges themselves, but whether such exchanges form a predictable political link with legislative behavior. Past experience has repeatedly caused alarm — after a delegation of KMT officials led by party caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) returned from their visit to China in April 2024, the Legislative Yuan promptly advanced a series of highly controversial amendments, most notably measures aimed at expanding legislative oversight, some of which were later declared unconstitutional.
Now, the opposition is, on one hand, cutting key items from the special defense budget, blocking policies aimed at building “non-red” supply chains and weakening Taiwan-US cooperation. On the other hand, it has put forward 15 “joint proposals” with Beijing following the KMT-CCP forum. Society is well within its rights to reasonably question whether this is merely a prelude to a broader policy shift.
From a legal and institutional perspective, the true risk lies not in the rhetoric of the forum, but in how its outcomes are subsequently institutionalized and translated into actual policy.
Whether it involves relaxing restrictions on cross-strait personnel exchanges, promoting industrial and AI cooperation, or establishing mechanisms for collaboration in healthcare and disaster prevention, once such measures are implemented through legislative amendments, budget allocations or administrative deregulation, unavoidable questions arise — do such measures conflict with the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法), national security review mechanisms or the regulatory framework?
Yet these issues — central to the bottom line of the rule of law — were deliberately sidestepped at the KMT-CCP forum, only to potentially resurface in the Legislative Yuan as operational institutional realities.
What is worth even greater attention is that Beijing never makes unconditional investments.
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning’s (王滬寧) reception was not a matter of diplomatic courtesy, but an evaluation of political performance. When the CCP publicly praises the opposition’s obstruction of the special defense budget, Taiwanese cannot focus solely on gestures framed as “goodwill toward people’s livelihoods” while overlooking the potential institutional impact.
Exchange should be allowed, but only if clear boundaries are in place. Dialogue can take place, but the rule of law and national security cannot be treated as bargaining chips.
In the face of carefully crafted “joint proposals,” what is most needed at this moment is an institutional inquiry: Would these commitments ultimately be translated into workable policies in the Legislative Yuan?
Yeh Yu-cheng is a secretary at the Pingtung County Public Health Bureau.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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