Smart economic policymaking invariably requires trading off some pain today for greater future gains.
However, this is a difficult proposition politically, especially in democracies. It is always easier for elected leaders to indulge their constituents immediately, on the hope that the bill will not arrive while they are still in office.
Moreover, those who bear the pain caused by a policy are not necessarily those who would gain from it.
That is why today’s more advanced economies created mechanisms that allow them to make hard choices when necessary. Chief among these are independent central banks and mandated limits on budget deficits. Importantly, political parties reached a consensus to establish and back these mechanisms irrespective of their own immediate political priorities.
One reason that many emerging markets have swung from crisis to crisis is that they failed to achieve such consensus.
However, recent history shows that developed economies, too, are becoming less tolerant of pain, perhaps because their own political consensus has eroded.
Financial markets have become volatile once again, owing to fears that the US Federal Reserve would tighten its monetary policy significantly to control inflation, even though many investors still hope that the Fed will go easy if asset prices start to fall substantially.
If the Fed proves them right, it would become that much harder to normalize financial conditions in the future.
Investors’ hope that the Fed will prolong the party is not baseless.
In late 1996, then-Fed chair Alan Greenspan warned of financial markets’ “irrational exuberance.”
However, the markets shrugged off the warning and were proved correct. Perhaps chastened by the harsh political reaction to Greenspan’s speech, the Fed did nothing, and when the stock market eventually crashed in 2000, it cut rates, ensuring that the recession was mild.
In a testimony to the US Congress Joint Economic Committee the previous year, Greenspan said that while the Fed could not prevent “the inevitable economic hangover” from an asset price boom, it could “mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.”
The Fed thus assured traders and bankers that if they collectively gambled on similar assets, it would not limit the upside, but it would limit the downside if their bets turned bad.
Subsequent Fed interventions have entrenched such beliefs, making it even harder for it to rein in financial markets with modest moves.
Now that much more tightening and consequent pain might be needed, a consensus in favor of it might be harder to achieve.
Fiscal policy is also guilty of peddling supposedly painless economic measures.
Most would agree that the COVID-19 pandemic created a need for targeted spending (through extended, generous unemployment benefits, for example) to shield the hardest-hit households.
However, in the event, the spending was anything but targeted.
The US Congress passed multitrillion-dollar bills offering something for everyone.
The US Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), for example, provided US$800 billion in grants (effectively) for small businesses across the board.
A new study from Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist David Autor and his colleagues estimates that the program helped preserve 2 million to 3 million job years of employment of more than 14 months, at a stupendous cost of US$170,000 to US$257,000 per job year.
Worse, only 23 to 34 percent of this money went directly to workers who would otherwise have lost their jobs. The balance instead went to creditors, business owners and shareholders.
All told, an estimated three-quarters of PPP benefits went to the top one-fifth of earners.
Of course, the program might have saved some firms that otherwise would have collapsed, but at what cost?
While capitalists anticipate profits, they also sign up for possible failure. Moreover, many small businesses are tiny operations without much organizational capital. If a small bakery had to close, the economic fallout would have been mitigated by the enhanced unemployment insurance, and if it had a loyal clientele, it could restart after the pandemic, perhaps with a little help from a bank.
The standard line is that the unconstrained spending was driven by a sense that unprecedented times called for unprecedented measures. In fact, it was the response to the 2008 global financial crisis that broke the previous consensus for more prudent policies.
Lasting public resentment that Wall Street had been helped more than Main Street motivated politicians in the US’ two major parties to spend with abandon when the pandemic hit.
However, targeted unemployment benefits were associated with the Democratic Party, leaving Republicans seeking wins for their own constituencies. Who better to support than small businesses?
While political fractures were driving up untargeted spending, budget hawks were nowhere to be found: Their voices had been steadily drowned out by economists.
In addition to the cranks who show up periodically to advocate ostensibly free lunches through money-financed spending, a growing chorus of mainstream economists had been arguing that prevailing low interest rates gave developed countries significantly more room to expand fiscal deficits.
Politicians who were eager to justify their policies ignored these economists’ caveats — that spending had to be sensible and that interest rates had to stay low. Only the headline message mattered, and anyone suggesting otherwise was dismissed as a hair-shirt fanatic.
Historically, it has been the Fed’s job to take away the monetary punch bowl before the party gets frenzied, and Congress’ job to be prudent about fiscal deficits and debt.
However, the Fed’s desire to spare the market from pain has driven more risk-taking and reinforced expectations of further interventions.
The Fed’s actions have also added to the pressure on Congress to do its bit for Main Street, which in turn has led to inflation and a belief that the Fed would back off from raising rates.
All of this makes a return to the previous consensus more difficult. When the Fed does raise rates significantly, the US government’s costs of servicing the debt from past spending would limit future spending, including on policies to reduce inequality (which has fueled political fragmentation), combat future emergencies and tackle climate change.
Every economy has a limited reservoir of policy credibility and resources, which are best used to mitigate genuine economic distress, not to shield those who can bear some pain.
If everyone wants a free lunch, the bill would eventually be paid by those least able to afford it. Emerging market economies have had to learn this the hard way. Developed countries might have to learn it again.
Raghuram Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, is a finance professor at University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS