As cross-Taiwan Strait tensions heat up, the Philippines expressed its desire to stay neutral on the flashpoint. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte made the remarks on Dec. 23 in a command conference to coordinate the government’s delivery of relief to provinces battered by a recent destructive typhoon. The statement underpinned growing wariness about getting entangled in a possible conflict, especially should its treaty ally, the US, get involved and the theater of conflict expand to the South China Sea.
On Dec. 1, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe said that “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-US alliance.”
Although unofficial, his words were by far the strongest expression of concern about recent developments across the strategic Strait.
The message resonates not only in Washington, Tokyo and Taipei, but also in other allied capitals. The simmering tensions might have prompted Duterte to wade in.
Manila’s stand is motivated more by pressing domestic concerns than indifference to disturbing developments in its neighborhood. Health and economic priorities dominate the agenda as the country heads to elections in May. With the rise of the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2, preventing a COVID-19 resurgence takes primacy.
Furthermore, driving recovery from the pandemic, distributing relief and rehabilitating areas damaged by Typhoon Odette (known internationally as Rai), one of the most destructive to hit the country, are already stretching the government’s resources thin.
The stakes are also high should it find itself inadvertently drawn into a scuffle.
The Duterte administration’s “independent foreign policy,” the already exacting task of navigating the US-China rivalry, and the country’s adherence to Beijing’s “one China” policy might all be put to the test.
As the Southeast Asian country closest to the Taiwan Strait, the prospects are dire if cooler heads do not prevail. The waters around the Batanes islands and off northern Luzon might become the site of naval skirmishes. The arena might also expand to the broader South China Sea, where Beijing, Taipei and Manila, among others, occupy contested geological features.
Trade and investment flows stand to be disrupted, and a humanitarian crisis looms large should diplomacy fail.
Both sides of the Strait are key economic partners of the Philippines. Beijing is its top trading partner, second-largest investor and rising infrastructure builder, while Taipei is its eighth-largest trade partner and ninth-largest investor. The Philippines in 2018 signed a memorandum of understanding with China to formalize cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative.
It renewed a 1992 Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan in 2017, giving a boost to Taipei’s New Southbound Policy. About 150,000 Filipinos work in Taiwan and might have to be repatriated should conflict ensue.
In an already tense atmosphere, picking a side might contribute to raising the temperature further. Manila thinks it is better to avoid trouble if it can when its existential interests are not on the line, and the odds of it absorbing disproportionally high collateral damage is great.
Moreover, while cross-strait developments are disconcerting, they do not attain the same level of media coverage and public attention as the South China Sea. Most Filipinos do not appreciate the worsening situation and the stakes involved. Even Philippine migrant workers in Taiwan do not feel or express a heightened sense of apprehension to demand evacuation or implore their families back home to bring the matter to Manila’s attention.
For now, interest in the flashpoint remains confined to a narrower audience, notably security and policy circles. The only upside to Duterte’s remarks last month is that they brought the issue to official and national attention. Going forward, officialdom might follow developments more closely.
However, the possible involvement of the US and expansion of the conflict to the West Philippine Sea might strain Manila’s desire to stay out of harm’s way.
The presence of US troops in the country under the restored Visiting Forces Agreement and positioning of US hardware under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) might put the country in Beijing’s line of fire.
This is especially so if US assets that would respond to a Taiwan emergency sail from or fly from Philippine bases under the EDCA. Washington’s participation in a Taiwan crisis would put the 70-year-old alliance on the spot.
However, a rethink will not be easy. It would spark an acrimonious debate over taking part in a war when the country’s bottom line is not directly affected.
That said, the value of honoring its commitment to an alliance that long played an integral role in deterrence and external defense holds merit.
Those who favor restraint and support neutrality might cite the US’ failure to dissuade Beijing from changing facts on the ground in the South China Sea dispute from 2014 to 2016 while an arbitration case with Manila was ongoing. Washington’s neutrality in the six-party territorial and maritime row might be played up by Manila, saying it does not take a side in a cross-strait spat.
Even if a new president elected this year thinks differently, invoking the Philippine 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is also neither automatic nor solely the executive’s privilege — the Philippine Congress has a big say in activating it.
Amid pressing domestic priorities, deliberating on an issue with low public salience and against the wishes of a departing but still popular leader stack the odds even among supportive solons.
Duterte portrayed brewing cross-strait tensions as a mere sideshow to the broader US-China competition playing out in a decades-old regional flashpoint. While such a view might be disputed, the depiction helps justify his stand. Eschewing action that might exacerbate already edgy times is prudent. Given its robust relations with all parties involved, Manila’s move might even temper searing passions.
Whether Manila’s neutrality holds and whether its view influences that of its Southeast Asian neighbors, only future events will tell.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation of the Philippines.
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