In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions.
It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is.
Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions in exchange for Chinese restraint, or some kind of brokered one-shot resolution — rest on the fantasy that Beijing wants peace and just needs a polite nudge. There is no evidence for this. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has steadily escalated its military threats, cyberattacks and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan regardless of who is in power in Taipei or how careful they are with their words. When Beijing says it would use all means to annex Taiwan, “by force if necessary,” it is clear that it sees its goal as more important than peace.
Therefore, Lai’s recent language, including his description of China as a “foreign hostile force,” is not a wild provocation, but rather a blunt acknowledgment of reality. Beijing flies fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, simulates blockades and treats Taiwan as a rogue province to be absorbed. Lai is simply responding to years of coercion. If Taiwan stating the facts “angers” China, that is a problem with China’s ego, not Taiwan’s messaging.
Telling the US to “rein in” Taiwan unilaterally does not signal to Beijing any goodwill to be reciprocated. It signals to Beijing that threats work — and that Washington would cave if pushed hard enough.
The recent rise in cross-strait tensions is not a result of Lai’s rhetoric. It is the product of Beijing’s relentless “gray zone” operations — cyberattacks, economic coercion and military harassment that now includes near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This is not theoretical brinkmanship. It is real-world intimidation, and it deserves to be called what it is.
The authors also revert to the idea of both sides agreeing to “some kind of one China” as a supposed off-ramp to de-escalation. This idea, known as the so-called “1992 consensus,” posits that Taipei and Beijing agree they are part of the same country and the only disagreement is over the fact that there are two administrations within that country. In other words, this position requires Taiwan to agree it is part of China as a precondition to dialogue with China.
Taiwan wants an open dialogue with China to talk about how Taiwan and China can coexist, whether as separate countries, the same country, or some type of special arrangement. Lai, as well as every Taiwanese president before him, has stated that Taiwan is open and eager to engage in dialogue with Beijing without any preconditions.
However, that is not the dialogue Beijing is interested in having. Beijing’s “dialogue” requires Taiwan to agree it is part of China, therefore agreeing with China’s conclusion, as an admission ticket to the negotiating table. China is only interested in talking about how Taipei is to execute Beijing’s foregone conclusion.
To be sure, Chivvis and Wertheim understand that this position is divorced from reality. Even they called it “useful fiction” in their own words. It had been the longstanding position of Taiwan, but that has changed — at the moment Taiwanese voters realized that it is just a fiction. Taiwanese voters have rejected it in three straight elections. No democratic government can revive a fiction the public no longer believes.
Even if Lai were to utter this statement as “just words,” would Beijing find them credible if everyone understands they are just words? Demanding Taipei return to a script it has already discarded is not diplomacy — it is gaslighting.
The core asymmetry in cross-strait dialogue is not about tone or timing — it is about terms. Taipei seeks dialogue without preconditions, willing to negotiate within the reality of two differing outcomes. Beijing, meanwhile, demands Taipei accept its preferred outcome as a precondition for dialogue. That is not negotiation. That is extortion with a smile and a gun pointed at Taiwan’s face.
The simple truth is that if China believed Taiwan would willingly merge with China, it would not need to hold on to the use of force as a threat.
As for the US, yes, only one-third of Americans say they would support going to war for Taiwan. That is a serious issue — but it is not solved by pressuring Taiwan. If anything, mixed signals from Washington make war more likely. Deterrence only works if the message is consistent: Taiwan is not alone, and threats would not be rewarded with silence.
US foreign policy has had a long habit of praising Taiwan’s democracy in public, while treating it like a problem to be managed in private. Every once in a while, a think tank piece gets published that calls for Washington to “rein in” or to instruct or pressure Taiwan in an uncomfortably condescending way toward Taiwan and its people. Sadly, it is true that telling Taiwan what to do is a much more pleasant task than being principled with China, just like it is easier to tell a third grader to hand over his lunch money to the bully than to deal with the bully directly.
Taiwan is not poking the bear; it is trying to survive having to live next to it. The US should not be in the business of shushing democracies under threat. It should be standing beside them.
The stakes are high. Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has told his military to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027. Beijing continues to exclude Taiwan from international organizations, apply economic pressure and simulate blockades. These are not abstract chess moves — they are real steps toward a conflict the world cannot afford.
If Washington wants to prevent that war, it should not start by asking Taiwan to pretend its democracy does not exist. It should start by calling out the party that is changing the “status quo” by force, and supporting the one that is defending it with ballots. The right order of de-escalation starts with Beijing ratcheting down its intimidating tactics and intentional diplomatic isolation of Taiwan.
What the moment calls for is not a grand bargain, but a disciplined, stepwise approach. Confidence-building measures, military hotlines, crisis communications and rules of engagement are far more likely to reduce miscalculation than symbolic pledges or performative restraint. Restraint, when unreciprocated, invites aggression, especially the kind that is predicated on a foundation of lip-service to an outdated fictional arrangement.
Yeh Chieh-ting is a venture investor in Silicon Valley, the editor in chief of Ketagalan Media and a director of US Taiwan Watch, an international think tank focusing on Taiwan-US relations.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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