The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics.
An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency. HEMP weapons fit both criteria. In nanoseconds, a single HEMP detonation at an altitude between 20km and 50km can disable electronic infrastructure across large swathes of Taiwan. There would be little warning, as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fields DF-17 hypersonic missiles, capable of delivering a HEMP warhead above Taiwan in a matter of minutes.
HEMPs strike at the foundation of modern society, its electronic systems. Every critical infrastructure uses electronics, from telecommunications, hospitals, energy production and distribution facilities, and even water purification systems. In the defense sector, modern weapon systems rely on automated targeting equipment, early warning systems and digital communications as a part of an integrated kill chain, all of which are reliant on electronic components vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. The threat HEMPs presents to society and the military prompted the late Peter Vincent Pry, once the leading US expert on the electromagnetic threat, to describe HEMPs as “civilization killers.”
This heavy reliance on electronics makes threats to power generation and distribution systems particularly acute. Pull the plug from all these systems simultaneously, and what would have been isolated disruptions become cascading failures across the nation. Taiwan’s power grid is highly centralized and therefore particularly vulnerable to such systemic disruptions. A stark warning came in March 2022, when a single human error at the Hsinta Power Plant triggered a nationwide blackout, plunging more than 5 million households into darkness. Although it was accidental, the event exposed the risks posed by single points of failure in the grid. Based on this description of HEMPs and their effects, they are an ideal weapon for the PLA informatized warfare strategy. Under this doctrine, the PLA aims to target its adversaries’ technological nodes with sudden coordinated cyber and electromagnetic attacks “to cause the enemy to be too surprised to defend,” according to a series of lectures by the PLA National Defense University. Rather than attempting to target Taiwan’s hundreds of military facilities individually, a single well-placed HEMP strike could disable most of them in one stroke.
Some China watchers might shrug off the HEMP threat as highly unlikely, pointing to China’s nuclear no-first-use policy. However, China does not view HEMPs as a nuclear weapon, despite its use of a nuclear warhead. Instead, China integrates EMP capabilities into its cyber and space warfare. The PLA’s Science of Military Strategy, one of its guiding strategic documents, dedicates an entire chapter to the “cyber-electromagnetic-space” domain. This is significant not only because it further indicates that HEMPs are viewed outside of China’s nuclear policy, but also that it is seen as a cyberweapon with space implications. Cyberweapons could be the spearhead for any major PLA operation under its informatized warfare doctrine, with the Science of Military Strategy stating that “the victory of the war begins with the victory of cyberspace.”
In coordination with other cyberoperations, HEMPs could be used by the PLA as a first strike attack option to paralyze Taiwan’s defenses, paving the way for uncontested missile strikes and amphibious assaults.
Addressing the HEMP threat would be difficult, as it lacks much attention from the public and the government. This is primarily due to a naive belief that China would not break from its no-first-use policy, which is not as strongly held as is professed. Moreover, there is an intense normalcy bias regarding EMP weapons, as there is little precedent for their use. The times that we saw these weapons in action, mainly in the Ukraine-Russia war, were limited to drone jamming devices, which are not nearly as destructive as HEMPs and other high-powered EMP weapons. Therefore, following this line of logic, due to the uncertainty over the deployment of a HEMP weapon, it only makes sense for defense planners to focus on more urgent threats from China in the form of missile strikes and amphibious assaults.
We would strongly caution against ignoring the HEMP threat, as the risk it presents to Taiwan’s society and military is so devastating that it outweighs the presumed unlikelihood of its use. As US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby said in his book The Strategy of Denial, “the perception that something is unlikely can lead to actions presuming its implausibility, which in turn can strain the rationale for its being unlikely in the first place.”
Tin Pak is a visiting academic at the National Defense University. Chen Yu-cheng is an associate professor at the National Defense University.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has offered Taiwan a paradoxical mix of reassurance and risk. Trump’s visceral hostility toward China could reinforce deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Yet his disdain for alliances and penchant for transactional bargaining threaten to erode what Taiwan needs most: a reliable US commitment. Taiwan’s security depends less on US power than on US reliability, but Trump is undermining the latter. Deterrence without credibility is a hollow shield. Trump’s China policy in his second term has oscillated wildly between confrontation and conciliation. One day, he threatens Beijing with “massive” tariffs and calls China America’s “greatest geopolitical
On Sunday, 13 new urgent care centers (UCC) officially began operations across the six special municipalities. The purpose of the centers — which are open from 8am to midnight on Sundays and national holidays — is to reduce congestion in hospital emergency rooms, especially during the nine-day Lunar New Year holiday next year. It remains to be seen how effective these centers would be. For one, it is difficult for people to judge for themselves whether their condition warrants visiting a major hospital or a UCC — long-term public education and health promotions are necessary. Second, many emergency departments acknowledge
US President Donald Trump’s seemingly throwaway “Taiwan is Taiwan” statement has been appearing in headlines all over the media. Although it appears to have been made in passing, the comment nevertheless reveals something about Trump’s views and his understanding of Taiwan’s situation. In line with the Taiwan Relations Act, the US and Taiwan enjoy unofficial, but close economic, cultural and national defense ties. They lack official diplomatic relations, but maintain a partnership based on shared democratic values and strategic alignment. Excluding China, Taiwan maintains a level of diplomatic relations, official or otherwise, with many nations worldwide. It can be said that
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) made the astonishing assertion during an interview with Germany’s Deutsche Welle, published on Friday last week, that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not a dictator. She also essentially absolved Putin of blame for initiating the war in Ukraine. Commentators have since listed the reasons that Cheng’s assertion was not only absurd, but bordered on dangerous. Her claim is certainly absurd to the extent that there is no need to discuss the substance of it: It would be far more useful to assess what drove her to make the point and stick so
RSS