Although Taiwan and Japan are facing the same military threat — the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — there is no formal military exchange between the two countries.
To break through diplomatic restrictions and cooperate militarily, it is necessary for the Japanese government to pass a law or motion in the Japanese National Diet to resolve this key strategic issue. Otherwise, the two sides cannot exchange the most basic air defense information with each other.
Japan’s Sankei Shimbun in February 2019 reported that Taiwanese officials had contacted the Japanese government through the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association to propose the establishment of a reciprocal mechanism for the live exchange of information on Chinese air force sorties.
However, then-Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s administration effectively rejected the proposal by declining to respond, saying only that there are no formal diplomatic relations between Taipei and Tokyo.
The newspaper article said that it was the first time Taipei had issued a proposal to Tokyo for formal defense cooperation.
Fortunately, with a change of Japanese prime ministers and various Cabinet reshuffles in the past few years, an opportunity has arisen on the sensitive issue of whether Taiwan and Japan should establish military cooperation.
On Dec. 23 last year, 127 Japanese city, township and village-level leaders launched the Japan-Taiwan Co-prosperity Leader Alliance in Tokyo. With the military threat from China continuing to grow, the alliance calls for a Japanese version of the US’ Taiwan Relations Act, and urges the Japanese government to use legislation to bolster Taiwan-Japan security so that the two sides can engage in dialogue on security issues.
The initiative suggests that many people in Japan generally agree on an “anti-China, pro-Taiwan” stance.
Faced with China’s military having long ago exceeded the scope of a containable “Taiwan Strait war,” Tokyo has in the past few years been working to improve the US-Japan security alliance, while the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have also enhanced their electronic warfare deployment in Okinawa to prepare for a Beijing-launched war against Taiwan.
In other words, Tokyo has always been aware of the great importance of Taiwan’s strategic position in East Asia. Were China to take Taiwan by force, left without Taiwan’s critical role in the “first island chain” that has been holding back China’s military expansion, Japan would find it almost impossible to prevent Beijing from breaching its national security.
On Jan. 7, US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers held the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Meeting.
Apart from reiterating the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the two countries pledged to cooperate to deter China from sabotaging regional stability, and to respond to such provocation if necessary.
Although Taipei has no military cooperation with Tokyo, there is a pressing need for closer interaction between the two nations based on their shared democratic values.
If a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act could be recognized and supported by the Japanese government, and be passed by the National Diet, it would be significant not just in terms of Taiwan-Japan military cooperation, but also strategically, through its creation of a greater US-Japan-Taiwan security alliance.
Yao Chung-yuan is a professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s strategic planning department.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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