In 2021 China and Russia escalated their military entente, bordering on an alliance, to the point that it renders obsolete U.S. strategies for deterring a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attack against Taiwan.
The United States has long carried the burden of building an evolving nuclear and conventional capability to sustain deterrence on a global basis. It is now important for Japan, Australia, Europe, Taiwan, and others — now targets for Russian and Chinese operations in the event of a Taiwan War — to consider how best to contribute new capabilities to strengthen U.S. deterrence of China and Russia.
A decision by CCP dictator Xi Jinping (習近平) to start a Taiwan War, perhaps as early as mid-decade, could be influenced decisively by Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s degree of success in capturing Ukrainian territory. U.S. intelligence sources now estimate that he could mass up to 175,000 troops for a multi-front strike early in 2022, most likely after the Winter Olympics in China.
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) surely will embed many observers in Russian Army, Navy, and Air Force strike units. They will see first-hand how Russia has built on lessons from its 2014 strike against Ukraine (which used Olympic games in Russia as a diversion) to combine new unmanned strike platforms with evolved electronic warfare, cyber-propaganda, and perhaps space operations, in support of irregular forces and formal Airborne and Air Assault deep strikes into Ukraine.
In contrast to Taiwan, much of the Ukrainian population is mobilized. They will fight savagely against the Russian invaders. This increases the chance that Russia may employ new very low yield nuclear artillery and bombs to obliterate Ukrainian resistance — a potential warning that Russia and the PLA may use similar weapons against Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.
China and Russia’s entente became more alliance-like when, on June 28, 2021, Xi and Putin extended for another five years their July 2001 China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation which had been due to expire in February 2022.
Most crucial for the CCP in this treaty was Russia’s affirmation that “…Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Russia is opposed to any form of independence of Taiwan.” Russia regularly repeats this formulation for the CCP’s benefit, as was done on October 12 by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Then on November 23, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和) signed a new five-year “roadmap” for bi-lateral military cooperation and exercises.
On November 24 Russia’s TASS state media cited Wei Fenghe as saying, “...China and Russia are united together like a great mountain. Our friendship is unbreakable. Together, we countered the hegemony of the US... Therefore, we’ve displayed our relations as being better than allied.”
The shape and extent of such “allied” military cooperation was further revealed in 2021.
During the August 9 to 13 Zapad/Interaction-2021 exercises, Russia sent army armor forces and Su-30MS strike fighters to a hi-tech training range in the PLA’s Western Theater Command to practice real joint-force operations necessary to conquer Taiwan. These included simultaneous ground assault, air assault, and air superiority operations including, for the first time, PLA Air Force’s best J-20 stealth air superiority fighters.
China also provided translated manuals so Russian troops could operate PLA armored systems, implying Russia might actually “donate” troops to help invade Taiwan.
From October 14 to 17, ten Russian and Chinese surface warships, two Russian submarines, and at least one Chinese submarine conducted their Naval Interaction-2021 exercise.
On October 15 the CCP’s Global Times reported, “…the Chinese and Russian navies will practice communications, sea mine countermeasures, air defense, live-fire shooting at maritime targets, joint maneuvering and joint anti-submarine missions…” Such operations would be necessary both to blockade Taiwan and to counter U.S. Navy forces seeking to support Taiwan.
On November 19, two PLA Air Force (PLAAF) H-6KG bombers and two Russian Air Force Tu-95MS bombers conducted the third China-Russia joint bomber exercise, which featured participation by Russian Su-35 fighters and A-50U airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, and then support by PLAAF KJ-2000 AWACS as the bombers flew down along Japan’s Ryukyu Islands down to the Miyako Strait.
Of some interest, the PLAAF bombers joined the Russian bombers over Russian territory, an indication Russia may allow the PLA to conduct strikes from the north against Japanese bases.
That same day, Russian bombers also flew toward Alaska, close enough to trigger interception from Canadian F/A-18C strike fighters, clearly indicating that when Russia decides to help China strike Japanese military forces, they may also simultaneously hold at risk or strike U.S. bases.
All of this highlights the wisdom of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act — which calls for the United States to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character” without specifying against whom.
Now that Russia presents a clear threat to Taiwan and other allies, especially Japan, it is time to work with Taipei and U.S. allies to consider their requirement for new, much longer-range, “strategic” capabilities for deterring attacks from Russia, in addition to China.
While Taiwan may not require new nuclear powered attack submarines, as the U.S. and Britain have agreed to help Australia acquire, it would be appropriate for Washington to consider an emergency transfer of used KC-135 tanker aircraft.
These would create an early capability for the Taiwan Air Force to refuel its F-16V fighters to counter Russian bombers to the north, before they come into cruise missile launch range or allow for limited retaliation to enhance deterrence. They could give Taiwan F-16s much greater endurance to counter larger PLAAF harassment missions.
It is also now appropriate for Washington to consider the sale of new 2,000+km medium range, or new 4,500km intermediate range, conventional missiles to Taiwan, depending on whether the capability to strike Russian naval forces in Vladivostok or Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines in Petropavlovsk is required to deter Moscow.
Such missiles should also be offered to Japan and Australia, both of which have been threatened by China for their opposition to a CCP war against Taiwan. There should also be consideration of leasing new U.S. B-21 stealth bombers to give Japan and Australia near-term very long-range reach against Chinese and Russian naval forces.
In addition, it is necessary to understand and respond to the CCP and Russia as comprising a joint global strategic threat. For example, promoting a global boycott of the February 2022 Winter Olympic Games in China is now necessary to help deter a Russian invasion of the Ukraine that could well be a prelude to a CCP invasion of Taiwan.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
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