China has enjoyed in recent years a reputation as a state that is deeply committed to the climate change agenda, yet it has received significant criticism for the failure of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to show up at the COP26 summit.
“China can do more, and it should,” said Tina Stege, climate ambassador for the Marshall Islands, which could submerge underneath the rising Pacific ocean.
These comments were underscored by Alf Wills, a former chief COP negotiator for South Africa, who said that other developing nations were loath to publicly criticize Beijing on this issue given that Chinese diplomats can be instrumental in delivering funding for them.
Yet it is the US that has been most forceful in its critique, with US President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, asserting that the Chinese are “significant outliers” among countries that have made commitments in an attempt to limit warming to 1.5°C, as agreed in Paris in 2015.
He asserted that Beijing had “an obligation to step up to greater ambition as we go forward” and that China is “a big country with a lot of resources and a lot of capabilities” which is “perfectly capable of living up to their responsibilities.”
While Sullivan’s critique needs to be seen in the context of the current tensions in US-China relations, the fact that other countries share at least some of his sentiment risks exacerbating the soft power challenges that Beijing already faces, which have the potential to become a growing headache for the ruling Chinese Communist Party in the 2020s.
China cares deeply about its international image and, according to David Shambaugh, a leading Sinologist at George Washington University, the nation is expected to spend about US$10 billion a year as part of a soft power campaign.
COP26 aside, a significant driver of China’s soft power problems is, ironically, its success in rapidly becoming a nascent superpower.
Indeed, the nation’s rise to greater prominence has been one of the defining features of the post-Cold War period, and this has been reinforced by major trade and diplomatic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative.
Take the example of Beijing’s growing economic power. IMF data since 2014 have asserted that the nation’s economy is now larger than its US counterpart on a purchasing power parity basis, which adjusts for goods being cheaper in China and other countries relative to the US.
However, the consequences of the country’s generally strong growth in recent decades have been more than economic. In terms of perceptions, many internationally believe that the global balance of power has swung significantly.
Pew Global Research has highlighted this stark change in international perceptions toward Beijing. A significant number of nations in its surveys now assert that China is the world’s “leading economic power.”
Much of the reason for these changed perceptions of China’s strength stem from the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. While much of the developed world subsequently recovered, at a sometimes slow pace, from the worst economic downturn for a generation, China has enjoyed mostly strong growth.
While welcomed by many in China who understandably like recognition of the country’s growing might, this opinion shift is not without headaches for Beijing, for it has exposed the country to greater foreign scrutiny and fed into perceptions, seized upon by politicians, tapping into concern about China’s rise.
The significantly brighter spotlight on the country, especially since 2008, has exposed a deficit of soft power that is complicating its rise to power.
Soft power is recognized by Beijing as a key political commodity, but one it has had limited success in cultivating.
As international perceptions of China’s power have changed, its global favorability has shown weakness in multiple key countries, as underlined by the Pew Research Center. This has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
A survey conducted by Pew in 14 countries said that a median of 61 percent of respondents believe that China has done a bad job dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak. Confidence in Xi also fell in surveyed countries, with the poll showing a median of 78 percent of those surveyed have little or no confidence in the leader.
Especially if critical scrutiny intensifies, Beijing must find better ways to tackle this soft power deficit. This includes enhanced international public diplomacy to win more foreign “hearts and minds.”
Beijing should also restart a process of addressing foreign concerns about its intentions as a rising power. It could intensify efforts to be seen as a responsible and peaceful global stakeholder, and match this rhetoric with actions.
In the post-pandemic era to come, this agenda will pose significant challenges. However, unless it is tackled, the nation’s soft power deficit could only grow bigger in the 2020s.
Andrew Hammond is an associate at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences’ foreign policy think tank LSE IDEAS.
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