In an article published in Foreign Policy magazine titled “China is a declining power — and that’s the problem,” two highly reputable academics use “power transition theory” (PTT) as a base for their arguments.
PTT was founded by my adviser at Claremont Graduate University, Jacek Kugler, and his mentor, A.F.K. Organski.
PTT believes that the unipolar world dominated by a single hegemony (from 1990 to last year) is the most stable setup in international relations compared with the bipolar (US-Soviet Union) or multipolar (Europe before World War II) world.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is undermining the current state of unipolar stability.
PTT believes that great power wars usually occur at the intersection of the rise of an emerging hegemony and the decline of the reigning “status quo” hegemony.
The two authors believe that in the past 150 years, emerging powers that have peaked and then plateaued — after experiencing a severe, long-term slowdown — usually do not quietly disappear.
Instead, they become arrogant and aggressive. They suppress dissent at home and try to regain economic momentum by establishing exclusive spheres of influence abroad. They invest a lot of money in the military and apply force to expand their influence.
This behavior usually triggers tensions between major powers. In some cases, it involves catastrophic wars.
The current situation of the Chinese Communist Party regime reflects the above scenario.
I must agree with most of the points of the Foreign Policy article. The good news is that the disastrous power of nuclear bombs might make all parties more prudent. The bad news is that misperception from China could still trigger a devastating major war.
My take, as well as that of the two authors, is that the fate of the world is in Xi’s hands and Taiwan is the main flashpoint.
Regardless of whether China’s power is declining or not, it is its elites’ perception that counts. Judging from Xi’s recent paranoid foreign and domestic policies, I conclude that he thinks he and his party are in trouble. That “misperception” will get the whole world into trouble.
I also conclude that Xi’s recent heavy-handed, centralized, overreaching economic and financial policies will stifle China’s economy; but it will take time to manifest unless everything I have learned since my college years is capitalist brainwashing garbage.
An authoritarian government that practices national capitalism such as Nazi Germany or China before Xi, under former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), may be a superior economic model if it can rein in its aggressive expansionism.
However, there is not a single government since the 20th century that has succeeded with the radical nationalization policy that Xi is now trying.
Xi has staked his reputation on Taiwan. When he turns 70 two years from now, he is going to become increasingly aware that his time is running out. People do not get into his position without having enormous egos, which they project out all through their lifetimes, so they become invested in the ridiculous belief that their “legacies” matter to them.
All in all, Taiwan is a big concern.
I hope Taiwan’s government and its people realize that. Buckle up everyone — the perfect storm is coming.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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