Hong Kong’s political situation and public sentiment have gravely deteriorated since China imposed a National Security Law in July last year. The security regime signifies the Chinese Communist Party’s takeover of the territory’s governance and ends the system of limited autonomy under the “one country, two systems” framework.
Demanding absolute political allegiance from Hong Kong lawmakers and public-sector employees, Chinese and Hong Kong authorities have prohibited political activism by democracy advocates, and the Hong Kong Police Force has implemented severe security restrictions to minimize public interactions.
A significant blankness has engulfed the territory where dissent and activism once thrived.
Beijing and its handpicked agents have implemented hostile measures against Hong Kong’s civil society under the pretext of a COVID-19 lockdown. By upholding a might-makes-right principle, the regime is perpetuating a dangerous idea that the gun is the ultimate arbiter of truth and power.
For months, the police force has detained several hundreds advocates amid an intensifying attack on opposition groups and the civic sector.
The closure of pro-democracy newspaper the Apple Daily in June marked the death of press freedom. The disbandment of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union and other civic organizations are signaling an absolute intolerance of dissent and free thought.
Hong Kongers confront enormous constraints on how to exercise their rights to compel the governing elites to change the autocratic rule. There are no public assemblies, no free press and no expression of critical opinions.
Gone are hopes for democratic transformation that shone through months-long protests in 2019. Previous conversations among Hong Kongers about political strategizing now switch to discussions about how to stay alive, avoid arrest and protect personal assets. Without a dialogic civil sphere, dissent is bound to take the form of spectacular violence.
Where can Hong Kongers turn to vent their legitimate grievances? Social media remains an imperfect, yet risky, platform. Even though the police force is monitoring online content and has pressured Facebook, Google, YouTube and Twitter to comply, widespread Internet access still offers opportunities for anonymity and for occasional outbursts of mild criticisms of the regime.
Online exchange between Hong Kongers and their overseas supporters has become a new frontier rather than an escape from harsh realities. At the moment, people cannot gather physically, but there is no limit to virtual gathering via MeWe, Clubhouse or Line.
The digital architecture still permits connection and communication across geographical and ideological boundaries.
In this world of connectivity, online activism can facilitate personal expressiveness, nurture the vernacular expressions of identity and memory, and build trust and solidarity.
As tens of thousands of Hong Kongers are leaving for Taiwan, the US, and the UK and other Commonwealth states, they are likely to benefit from the transformative potential of diasporic life, and learn to advance global lobbying efforts for the territory.
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is a history professor at Pace University in New York.
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