This month, Jiang Wen-hua (姜文華), a researcher who had studied abroad before returning to China and joining the faculty at Fudan University, slit the throat of Wang Yongzhen (王永珍), a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary assigned to the university’s mathematics department. The incident attracted the attention not only of foreign media, but also of Chinese studying overseas.
Even though many universities in China can compete with those in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea in academic rankings, they cannot to shake the shadow of the CCP’s influence.
No matter how much money the CCP throws at its academic talent recruitment drive, it will never be able to establish the foundations for academic freedom at its universities.
Stuffing the system with cash — like fattening a goose to harvest foie gras — is simply not in the interests of the recipient of this “generosity.”
Jiang obtained a doctorate from Rutgers in New Jersey. On his return, as is the convention at Chinese universities, he was initially employed for six years, during which he was expected to publish research papers and submit them to international academic periodicals.
The university reviews the performance of people in that position, and a decision is made on whether to promote them person or offer them a long-term position at the university.
Radio Free Asia reported that Jiang had passed the review, but his hopes for advancement were ultimately dashed by Wang’s veto.
Factions exist within universities in Taiwan, too. I have taught a law instructor who spoke openly about being assigned by the government to a position at a state-owned bank, and there are cases of university lecturers being given posts due to their political views.
In China, universities are still run like political worker cadres schools, at which the CCP oversaw who was promoted, leading to networks based on loyalty and a culture that breeds corruption.
When personal enmities enter the mix, a party secretary assigned to an institute wields a lot of power.
Many Taiwanese academics have moved to China, lured by generous remuneration, but they do not dare discuss such issues.
Nevertheless, from the way that some universities in Hong Kong have seemingly abandoned all sense of academic principles, it is easy to see why Wang was killed.
An academic studying in Germany interviewed by broadcaster Deutsche Welle said that the Chinese government is prepared to pay twice the normal salary to poach an academic who has published well-received papers.
However, it is doubtful whether such efforts to graft talent would ultimately bear fruit, the academic said.
If an academic has avoided offending the CCP leadership in the course of their research, and if they have never criticized any of the party’s policies, then they can go about their business.
However, academia — irrespective of their field — must remain free and open if they are to produce excellent work and receive international approval.
Moreover, the more commercial the research results, and the more openness and respect for academic freedom, the more innovation is generated, which leads to nations gaining dominance in fields.
It is in this that the US has an advantage over China, and the CCP is not going to resolve the problem by spending more. The secret lies in allowing freedom of thought to flourish, even if that means sometimes having universities oppose the government’s authority.
If the CCP wants to prevent cases such as Wang’s killing, it must foster a society and political system that allows freedom to develop.
Chang Hsun-ching is a former librarian.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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