On Friday last week, the Legislative Yuan adopted a resolution urging the military junta in Myanmar to restore democracy, respect human rights and stop using force against peaceful protesters.
The resolution was drafted by the Democratic Progressive Party, with a second draft proposed by the New Power Party and passed with cross-party support.
It is a welcome development, and heartening that political partisanship was laid to one side on this occasion. For many, this call was too long in coming and did not go far enough. The sentiments entailed were noble, but they were not backed up by actions, such as sanctions.
It is important to have realistic expectations of what Taiwan’s condemnation of the Feb. 1 coup can achieve, and to determine what the focus of the government’s efforts should be, given the rapidly changing situation in Myanmar.
The junta has historically been resistant to international condemnation and sanctions. The nation’s military mindset and the paranoia of the junta are deeply rooted, and the five-year experiment with limited democracy seems to have come to an end. If the junta had wanted to project an image of Myanmar being an investment-friendly environment before, it long ago jettisoned that.
The instability has caused overseas investors, including Taiwanese businesspeople, to flee or to significantly cut production as orders plummet, spurred international companies to withdraw investment and decimated investor confidence in the country, not only for the duration of the current unrest, but indefinitely, in a country where coups can suddenly occur.
Even though Taiwanese companies and banks have significant investments in the country, Taiwan has limited influence on the junta’s calculations. The fact that Taiwan has voiced support for the people of Myanmar, democracy and human rights has its value, given the more low-key responses from other democracies in the region, such as South Korea and Japan, and from ASEAN — which stuck to its principle of non-interference in members’ internal affairs — or the active resistance from China, which does have serious clout with the junta, but has vetoed action against it in the UN.
This value lies in standing up for the principles of respect for human rights and democracy. It also lies in allowing Taiwan to increase its profile as a democratic nation and to further differentiate it from China, although the latter has more to do with optics, and the deteriorating situation in Myanmar requires action to protect lives.
The situation in Myanmar is increasingly more than a brutal crackdown against a citizenry seeking to safeguard democracy. The precarious nature extends beyond the junta’s bloody attempts to suppress supporters: Peace and stability are also threatened by the presence of militant groups — the “ethnic armed organizations” — challenging the junta in the nation’s border regions.
There is a real danger that Myanmar could fall into a civil war and become a failed state. If this happens, Taiwanese in Myanmar would be in danger, and Burmese in Taiwan would be unable to return home.
The resolution stated the need to provide assistance and information to the hundreds of Taiwanese businesspeople living in Myanmar, and help — including extension of residency — for Burmese living in Taiwan.
If the situation does deteriorate significantly, it would require more than this. The government has already laid on charter flights to bring Taiwanese wishing to return back home, but it might need to strongly advise those remaining to return as a matter of urgency, and to offer more long-term support for Burmese here on humanitarian grounds.
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