On Feb. 19, the Presidential Office announced that it was reshuffling its top national security officials. The public seem to have high expectations for the new heads of defense, intelligence and China affairs, hoping that they will create a new situation capable of breaking the cross-strait deadlock.
However, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) routine activities in Taiwan’s southeastern air defense identification zone (ADIZ) entered a new phase on Feb. 19 and 20, leaving no room for optimism.
Since the Ministry of National Defense began announcing the activities of PLA aircraft in the real-time military news section on the its Web site in September last year, PLA aircraft entered the zone on 20 days in October, 22 in November, 19 in December, 27 in January and 14 last month, as of Monday last week. Of these incursions, Chinese H-6 bombers and J-16 and Su-30 fighters with land and sea strike capabilities were only dispatched on Sept. 18, Sept. 19 and Nov. 2 last year, as well as on Jan. 23, Jan. 24 and Feb. 8, Feb. 19 and Feb. 20.
The use of H-7 bombers on Feb. 19 was a qualitative change. In the past, the PLA’s land-attack and anti-ship missions were solely handled by H-6s, J-16s and Su-30s. Although derivative models of the H-7 participated in the China, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan army games in 2019, production of the H7 has been discontinued. Compared with China’s fourth-generation fighters, such as the J-16 and Su-30, the H-7 is clearly inferior in terms of functionality, mobility and surveillance and reconnaissance capability.
Surprisingly, the Financial Times reported that during the H-6’s entry into the zone on Jan. 23, the PLA used the USS Theodore Roosevelt as a simulated attack target. When the US carrier group returned to the Philippine Sea on Feb. 19, the PLA dispatched H-7s that day and then a composite formation of H-6s and H-7s the next day. Whether the PLA repeated the simulated attack is unknown, but Beijing has clearly incorporated its previous-generation bombers into its frontline military training.
In other words, the PLA’s war of attrition has entered a new stage. Not only has it employed slow-flying aircraft to consume labor, fuel and parts of Taiwan’s air force, it has also adopted a strategy of using inferior equipment to wear down superior equipment.
Moreover, as the Su-30s, J-16s and H-7s took off from air bases in Zhejiang, Guangdong and Hainan provinces respectively, they were guided by the PLA Navy’s Y-9JB electronic warfare and reconnaissance planes and Y-9G electronic warfare and surveillance planes. Since PLA Air Force aviation regiment commander Liu Rui (劉銳) unveiled the PLA’s push for “regular, systematic and actual combat training” in 2017, such training has been extended from arms coordination to joint forces operations.
The PLA’s frequent entries into Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ and simulated attacks targeting US military vessels are similar to the air guerrilla warfare concept in Seeking Shadows in the Sky: The Strategy of Air Guerrilla Warfare by Patricia Hoffman, former commander of the US 552nd Air Control Wing.
The PLA has gradually brought the concepts of land guerrilla warfare to the air in Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ, while Taiwan is stuck in the mud as its aircraft are worn down by inferior Chinese planes.
The most urgent task of Taiwan’s new national defense, intelligence and China affairs leadership is to review the country’s countermeasures, including adjusting air patrol operations and deploying air-defense missile systems to track and monitor Chinese military aircraft.
Lu Li-shih is a former instructor at the Republic of China Naval Academy and former captain of the ROCS Hsin Chiang.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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