If US President Donald Trump’s remaining days as president — his successor, US president-elect Joe Biden, formally takes over on Jan. 20 — are viewed as a lame-duck period, the outgoing president could use this transition period to vigorously reinforce the US’ commitment to support Taiwan if China ever attacked it.
After all, Trump’s predecessors also used their final weeks in office to do the things they were unable to do in the thick of the presidency because of pressures.
The last few weeks of a president’s term — Trump had not conceded as of the middle of this month and was legally challenging Biden’s election victory in US courts — provide them a rare opportunity to pardon people who have run afoul of the law or committed transgressions and even crimes. They also have the power to correct foreign policy aberrations, inconsistencies and weaknesses.
Although he is not expected to nullify or overturn Washington’s “one China” policy, Trump can, at least, strengthen Taiwan’s position by removing ambiguities in Washington’s commitment to support Taiwan if it is ever attacked by China. Taiwan faces tensions and encroachments of its sovereign territory on an almost daily basis by China’s military planes, which violate its air space, while Chinese warships enter its waters frequently.
Notwithstanding the threats Taiwan faces from China, the latter actually sees itself threatened by democratic Taiwan.
“It’s an unwelcome feeling for authoritarian and communist China to see a vibrant democracy like Taiwan with all the liberties and freedoms existing right at its doorstep. China fears that its citizens could possibly be influenced by Taiwan’s democratic values and ideals, and tries to block its citizens from getting too much exposure to Taiwan’s liberal and democratic values,” said a US expert on China, speaking on condition of anonymity.
To ensure its own global leadership role, both economically and militarily, the US needs to assert its position in the Pacific, where China’s belligerence toward its smaller neighbors has increased.
Taiwan is vulnerable to any aggression by China and needs a US-led umbrella supported by other like-minded democracies. There is always strength in unity and numbers.
The US needs to review its Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which was enacted by the US Congress on April 10, 1979, to support Taiwan in the event of aggression by China, but is peppered with ambiguities.
The TRA is the main template guiding US action in regard to Taiwan. The US position that Taiwan’s legal status has yet to be determined and that Taiwan is not part of China is the TRA’s broad-based tenor.
However, the TRA is notoriously ambiguous and cannot provide the desired deterrence against any Chinese designs on Taiwan. China could construe from this ambiguity that US support for Taiwan is mere lip service, involving occasional arms supply to Taiwan.
The US’ hesitation or failure to come to Taiwan’s help if China attacked it can send the wrong signal not only to China, but also to the US’ allies, raising questions about US credibility and reliability, not just in the Pacific, but also in the trans-Atlantic theater.
The US needs to impress upon China that it will under no circumstances tolerate any aggression against Taiwan.
China would certainly not like the US to be involved in a military conflict over Taiwan. The presence of US armed forces next to its borders is the last thing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) regime would want.
Some experts argue that clarity in its resolve to support Taiwan would have deterred China from committing the growing number of violations in Taiwan’s airspace and sea.
Chinese violations of Taiwan’s airspace peaked in October, with Chinese aircraft entering the nation’s airspace almost every day of the month, in addition to amphibious assault exercises in May, August and October.
China could also be conducting what is described as a form of “gray zone” warfare — an irregular type of conflict, which does not involve actual firing, but the aim of which is to exhaust the enemy into submission.
Xi attaches high priority to “recovering” Taiwan, and has aggressively upgraded the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) special force tasked with conquering Taiwan and its population of 23 million.
Xi needs to demonstrate to his skeptics in the Chinese Communist Party that he can take Taiwan. In a speech early last year, Xi emphasized that Taiwan “must be, will be” unified with China.
Indeed, conquering Taiwan would be the ultimate crowning glory of Xi’s political career. Taiwan is the last outpost of resistance to his dream of a unified and strong China that can oust the US as the major power in the Asia-Pacific region.
Besides glorifying Chinese nationalism, Taiwan’s conquest would give Beijing a strategically powerful position in Asia, placing the PLA in the center of the so-called “first island chain,” comprising the string of islands from the Japanese archipelago in the north to the Philippines and Borneo in the south. This would enable the PLA Navy to dominate the shipping lanes to North Asia, giving Beijing powerful leverage against Japan and South Korea, and providing the PLA Navy with free access to the Western Pacific.
If China invaded and took Taiwan by force, the US’ power and prestige as a security guarantor in Asia would suffer immensely.
While Taiwan has a well-trained and efficiently operating air force, it operates older aircraft such as the F-5 Tiger along with the modern F-16 Fighting Falcons.
Its F-5s and Indigenous Defense Fighters could provide the necessary numbers in a confrontation, although China’s technologically advanced aircraft can pose a serious threat to Taiwanese combat aircraft.
China has also inducted in its air force long-range bombers and purpose-built strike aircraft, and ship or shore-launched missiles. The Trump administration can bolster Taiwan’s air defense by the providing sophisticated aircraft to face the Chinese threat.
However, China dreads any US intervention; it requires access to overseas markets and resources to survive, and is dependent on the South and East China seas’ maritime routes. The US’ global position allows it to disrupt any maritime transport to and from mainland China by controlling critical chokepoints — the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb around the Persian Gulf region, the straits of Malacca and Lombok in the Indian Ocean.
Europeans, frustrated with China’s deceitful trade practices, its human rights violations in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, and its coverup of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, realize that it is necessary to unite under US leadership against China.
The US must take over the leadership role and send a strong and clear message to Beijing that Washington will not tolerate any aggression against Taiwan, and stand by it in such an eventuality.
If Trump can do this within the lame-duck period of his presidency, his successor is likely to pursue this approach, driven by the strong bipartisan sentiment in the US Congress against China, whose image has sunk to an all-time low in the eyes of most Americans.
Manik Mehta is a New York-based journalist with writing experience on foreign affairs, diplomacy, global economics and international trade.
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