On Tuesday, the Pentagon released its annual report to the US Congress, titled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020.
The report makes for sober reading. One of its biggest takeaways, aside form the conclusion that Taiwan no longer holds an advantage over China, is that Beijing now has command over the largest navy in the world, if measured by number of hulls: It has 350 ships, compared with the US’ 293.
While the US Navy still has a combined tonnage of at least twice that of China’s, Beijing is churning out increasingly sophisticated warships, reaching wartime levels of production. To put the scale of China’s shipbuilding program in perspective, an analysis by the UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies said that during a four-year period, naval vessels produced by Chinese shipyards were roughly equivalent in tonnage to the entire British Royal Navy or the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. This raises the question: Why does China need such a big fleet and what does it intend to do with it?
Retired Republic of China Air Force lieutenant general Chang Yen-ting (張延廷), in an article published on Monday, warned that China’s air force is fighting a war of attrition by constantly probing the Taiwan Strait median line and crossing into the Taiwanese air force’s “interception zone” (“Military must adapt, retired official says,” page 3).
It is a clever tactic: Taiwan has no choice but to defend its airspace by scrambling fighter jets to escort and drive away marauding Chinese aircraft. In doing so, China’s far larger air force can gradually wear out Taiwanese pilots and their aircraft.
The same tactic is being used against Japan. Its air force flew more than 900 sorties last year to investigate aircraft that had strayed into its air defense identification zone, the majority of which were Chinese, the Japanese Ministry of Defense said, adding that since 2016, it has dispatched four F-15s for each emergency scramble, in case the lead aircraft is ambushed and backup is required.
This means that China can wear out Japanese aircraft at a ratio of 4 to 1.
Taiwan’s and Japan’s defenses are being softened up without a shot being fired: a tactic straight from the pages of Chinese strategist Sun Tzu’s (孫子) The Art of War, in which Sun advocated “subduing the enemy without fighting.”
The Ministry of National Defense’s China Military Power Report 2020, published on Monday, states that China’s military does not yet have the capability to wage an all-out war against Taiwan.
However, Taiwan must not be complacent: The report also stated that China’s armed forces already possess the ability to enact a blockade of the nation.
This would be a risky move from China’s point of view, not least in dealing with the aftermath — international opprobrium, sanctions and an economically devastated Taiwan with a radicalized populace.
However, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has demonstrated time and again that he has a prodigious appetite for risk.
To those who argue that a blockade would not be in China’s interest, Hong Kong provides a corrective. Prior to Beijing’s imposition of its totalitarian National Security Law, conventional wisdom dictated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would never “kill the goose that lays the golden egg.”
Yet the CCP did the “unthinkable.” The reason: the CCP is an unreconstructed Leninist cabal that prioritizes its own survival over all else.
For the CCP, politics always trump economics.
Today, it is methodically pulling apart the fabric of Hong Kong to suit the CCP’s political needs. Be in no doubt, Beijing will be applying the same logic to Taiwan. To bastardize a phrase from James Carville, a strategist for former US president Bill Clinton: “It’s the politics, stupid.”
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