Last week, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the first Gulf country to agree to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, a symbolic milestone hinting at Islamic nations starting to accept the state of Israel as a fait accompli.
Even for sworn enemies, once reality has stood the test of time, it often triumphs over ideology.
Aggressive nations attempting to establish fait accompli are one of the most challenging aspects of international relations.
From the West Bank in Israel/Palestine to the Russian occupation of Crimea, the use of force can often render bilateral and mutually respectful negotiations irrelevant, especially when such use of force is not adequately challenged by some act in kind.
In the Asia-Pacific region, China is the obvious challenger to international order in the area, trying to establish new fait accompli around most of its border.
To the West, the Sino-Indian conflict was triggered by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military encroachment in disputed territory, in spite of time-honored consensus.
To the south, the artificial islands in the South China Sea and their subsequent militarization are a slap in the face for neighboring countries with competing claims that have relied solely on bilateral negotiations.
To the east, PLA Air Force fighters crossing the Taiwan Strait median line last year, sustained by various other novel military provocations, are all Beijing’s way of challenging the “status quo.”
Along with Beijing’s recent bludgeoning of Hong Kong’s freedoms and unique way of life, these are all the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to bend internationally accepted norms and values to its own liking.
These aberrations become fait accompli when the international community fails to deter such actions.
Faits accomplis are hardest to deal with when done using the salami-slicing tactic. The gradual buildup makes it hard for policymakers in opposing countries to decide on the right reaction to deter the aggressor, without being perceived as an overreaction.
Having said that, the policymaker is better served by overreacting than underreacting, as international attention is fleeting, whereas deterrence is lasting.
With that in mind, those who are unwilling to see the international order being held in contempt need to make their deterrence credible and contemplate the previously unthinkable.
Some of these actions might appear unseemly to the civilized and soft-spoken, and hence equal effort needs to be made in the justification of stronger deterrence.
This means that timely and strong-handed responses need to be accompanied by a reinvigoration of international lobbying and persuasion.
Part of the responsibility also falls upon civilized nations to make clear to the offender that international rule-breaking comes with consequences. Independent of the existing UN Security Council mechanism, economically powerful countries should consider pooling their markets together and threatening those whose actions violate the global consensus with sweeping economic sanctions.
While there might be immediate pangs from such policing of international relations, the long-term benefits of a rule-based and norms-respecting international atmosphere are worth the pain and effort.
After all, we all live in the same, interconnected world.
Bernard W is a University of Toronto International Relations alumnus.
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