US President Donald Trump’s administration has taken the next step in responding to communist China’s assault against the people of Hong Kong and their democratic aspirations. On Aug. 7, it imposed sanctions on Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥) and several other Hong Kong and Chinese officials.
It has not yet exercised the full range of punitive options available under the Hong Kong Democracy and Human Rights Act, which the US Congress passed and Trump signed this year.
However, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s expanding focus on Hong Kong and other human rights outrages by Beijing, and his call for other countries to join the effort, continue to provide hope to the many victims of Chinese communism, letting them know that the free world has not forgotten them.
The Trump administration is also shoring up Taiwan’s international status to deter any similar aggression by Beijing against that democratic society.
US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar last week visited Taipei to discuss with Taiwanese officials the nation’s exemplary record of preparing for and coping with the COVID-19 pandemic.
As the highest-ranking US official to visit Taiwan since 1979, Azar symbolizes the Trump administration’s commitment to closer Taiwan-US relations, despite Beijing’s threats. The visit faithfully implements Congress’ intent when it passed the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA), which became law last year.
The TTA and other bipartisan congressional actions approved by the US president demonstrate in symbolic and concrete ways the US’ commitment to the democratic security of Taiwan.
The approval by Trump’s administration of weapons sales long held back by the administration of US president Barack Obama will enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, as required by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
The Trump national security team has also lifted some restrictions on Taiwan’s forward defense activities, as evidenced by Taipei’s deployment of 200 Taiwanese marines to the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島) in the South China Sea.
Commenting on expanded US cooperation with Taiwan under the Trump administration, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Wang Ting-yu (王定宇), who is on the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, said: “The US used to condemn Taiwan if we posted the military on the Pratas and Taiping” (Itu Aba Island, 太平島), but concurred with the deployment this time.
All of these self-defense enhancement measures are essential, but by themselves, they can only incrementally strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend against a full-fledged attack from the vastly larger naval, air and missile forces of China’s People’s Liberation Army.
The only way that Beijing can be indefinitely deterred from military adventurism against Taiwan is by the certainty of US intervention.
China needs to be convinced that war against Taiwan would mean war against the US, which would destroy the economic development that China has built over decades.
So far, China’s leaders and military planners are not certain that they would need to face that suicidal outcome, which is why they continue preparations to attack Taiwan and to deter Washington’s intervention.
If shooting does start, China’s planning is based on the expectation that Washington would blink first and rush to one of its strategic off-ramps to prevent the situation from escalating.
Beijing’s default position in the past has been that the US, as the mature, responsible party, can be relied on to make concessions to de-escalate a crisis.
The conviction of Chinese leaders that in the end, the US would not come to Taiwan’s defense was again made clear by a statement about the Azar visit in the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda outlet: “The mainland has many cards, including the military card. More importantly, it is much more determined to play the cards than Washington.”
That is Beijing’s thinking in a nutshell: Convince leaders and the public in the US that China is more committed to taking Taiwan than Washington is to defending it. It is the message about “core interests,” “red lines” and “Chinese sovereignty” that the CCP has been repeating for seven decades until it becomes accepted in the West and in China as holy writ — and theoretically, leaves no room for Beijing to back down from its extreme positions.
However, in conversations with Americans, many Chinese indicate they do not share that view, but instead see Taiwan as a democratic model to be emulated, not an enemy to be crushed.
Under previous US administrations, China’s political and military leaders perceived a dwindling US commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense.
While continuing to push the envelope with provocative rhetoric and actions, they held back from an outright military attack, but they have never stopped building the capacity that they expect would tip the psychological balance against US intervention and enable a relatively low-risk aggressive move.
The Trump administration seems to have given Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and his colleagues some pause on the advisability of moving too close to kinetic action. The US’ anti-China mood has intensified with China’s reckless spread of the COVID-19 pandemic to the world.
Trump, after giving Xi a pass on his deceptive handling of the virus, has repeatedly stressed its China origin and reportedly said in April that he was “getting tired of China.”
Xi had already concluded that he was done with Trump once he realized that Trump was serious about forcing the structural changes in China’s economy needed to comply with the trade deal.
We might never know whether the pandemic’s devastation of Western economies was a fortuitous coincidence for China or something more sinister, but the US intelligence community confirmed this week what has been clear for months — that Beijing would like to see the “unpredictable” Trump gone and would be pleased to deal instead with former US vice president Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic presidential candidate, in the White House.
Former Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) famously told his generation of Chinese leaders that while China was building its economic and military power, it was prudent to keep a low profile to conceal their true intentions: “Hide your capabilities, bide your time.”
Xi has passed the point of coyness about what China believes it can do to the US Navy if it intervenes in a cross-strait conflict, but given the strong pushback from the Trump administration on Taiwan and a range of issues, he apparently has decided that China should bide its time a little longer and wait for Biden.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director in the office of the US secretary of defense. He is a fellow at the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies and a member of the advisory committee of the Global Taiwan Institute.
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