The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, otherwise known as the National Security Law, was passed by China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee on June 30 and took effect in Hong Kong the same day.
Article 43 of the law says that the Hong Kong police, when handling cases that involve threats to national security, “may take measures that law enforcement authorities ... are allowed to apply under the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in investigating serious crimes.”
Accordingly, Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥) on Monday last week convened a meeting to draw up the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the law.
The rules are divided into seven schedules. Worryingly, the only territory specifically named in these schedules is Taiwan, which makes one wonder whether this was done in reaction to the establishment of the Taiwan-Hong Kong Office for Exchanges and Services by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.
“The secretary for security and the commissioner of police may ... require a foreign or Taiwan political organization, or a foreign or Taiwan agent, to provide information by reason of activities concerning Hong Kong,” Schedule 5 says.
The Hong Kong government’s Legal Notification 139 of 2020, titled “Rules on Requiring Foreign and Taiwan Political Organizations and Agents to Provide Information by Reason of Activities Concerning Hong Kong,” which was also promulgated on Monday last week, goes into greater detail.
The notification states: “Taiwan political organization ... means ... a political party in Taiwan.” It also defines “Taiwan agent” as follows: “Taiwan agent ... means a person who ... is directly or indirectly directed ... supervised ... or controlled, employed, subsidized or funded by a Taiwan authority or Taiwan political organization, or accepts monetary or non-monetary rewards from a Taiwan authority or Taiwan political organization; and carries on all or part of the person’s activities for the benefit of a Taiwan authority or Taiwan political organization.”
This definition is a catch-all for anyone connected with Taiwan. The rules state that any such person convicted of not providing information as required by the Hong Kong authorities would face a fine of HK$100,000 (US$12,901) and six months in prison, while anyone convicted of providing information that is “false, incorrect or incomplete” would face a fine of HK$100,000 and two years in prison.
The Implementation Rules for Article 43 thus give the Hong Kong authorities carte blanche for eradicating Taiwan’s facilities in Hong Kong.
The National Security Law casts a shadow over each and every one of Taiwan’s agencies in Hong Kong, including the Mainland Affairs Council’s Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Hong Kong, the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Far East Trade Service and the Ministry of Culture’s Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Center.
Anyone associated with these offices who is told to provide information would face political pressure to do so, and the threat of a fine and imprisonment if they do not. Consequently, the Taiwanese government faces the issue of how to protect the personal safety of its staff members in Hong Kong so that they do not get unjustly accused and sacrificed for the ambitions of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). The government must come up with a response to this threat.
Shih Ya-hsuan is an associate professor in National Kaohsiung Normal University’s geography department.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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