After the Ocean Affairs Council submitted an assessment report to the Legislative Yuan in February on the feasibility of establishing airborne patrolling and monitoring capacity for the Coast Guard Administration (CGA), I wrote an opinion piece to explain the necessity of setting up such a unit, given the situation and developments in other countries.
The opinion piece, published by the Chinese-language Liberty Times (sister newspaper of the Taipei Times) on May 7 and the Taipei Times on May 30 (“CGA needs airborne capacity,” page 8) drew a variety of opinions.
Given the difficulties of finding a base for a new airborne unit, some said that the coast guard could achieve better aircraft support by working more closely with the Ministry of the Interior’s National Airborne Service Corps (NASC), which oversees non-military public aircraft under the government’s “aircraft centralization policy.”
Others said that the airborne unit’s maintenance would be costly for the coast guard and that staffing would be challenging, while still others questioned the necessity of having a unit to assist semi-military missions.
I have a few additional comments:
In addition to the NASC, which has one fixed-wing aircraft and 17 helicopters, other government agencies over the past few years have acquired or rented aircraft for their specific needs.
For example, the Civil Aeronautics Administration in 2013 bought a Beechcraft Super King B350iER aircraft for conducting flight tests.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2018 rented aircraft to provide medical evacuation services for the nation’s outlying islands: a Phenom 300 light jet stationed on Kinmen, and two AW169 helicopters stationed on Penghu and Matsu, respectively. The Forestry Bureau’s Aerial Survey Office plans to rent a fixed-wing aircraft for remote sensing so that it can continue conducting aerial photography missions.
The situation has expanded beyond the need and purpose envisioned by the central government when it established the NASC in 2004.
Establishing the specialized coast guard airborne unit would be a more professional and practical solution than borrowing aircraft from the NASC, which deploys aircraft over land and sea.
At a June 2 launch ceremony, the coast guard’s first 4,000-tonne patrol and rescue frigate was christened Chiayi (嘉義) by President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Four of the indigenous 4,000-tonne frigates are to be built by 2028, and all of them are to be equipped with helicopter hangars.
However, the NASC’s helicopters do not have foldable rotors, so they could only take off and land on the frigates, but not be transported by them. The NASC’s UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters are land-based aircraft, unfit for conducting extended sea missions.
The coast guard should establish its own helicopter unit with models that can be carried on the 4,000-tonne patrol frigates to enhance regional surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, increase rescue efficiency and ensure regional aviation safety.
In Taiwan’s 36,000km2 territory, there are 17 airports serving civilian needs — a higher density than in many other countries. However, the completion of the high-speed rail system and other major transportation projects has reduced the passenger and cargo volumes at airports, leaving some of them empty. One of these airports would be an ideal base for a coast guard airborne unit.
Through interdepartmental negotiations, the government could determine which airport would work best as the coast guard unit’s base. Putting a disused airport back into service would resurrect its transport capacity and lower the government’s maintenance costs.
Aircraft logistics and maintenance operations require a high level of expertise, so the coast guard should purchase aircraft models that are being used in Taiwan to take advantage of a mature aviation repair and maintenance workforce.
This would lighten the coast guard’s logistical task and generate more jobs in the aviation industry, which in turn would boost the recruitment and cultivation of skilled staff.
Admittedly, establishing an airborne unit is costly, with the construction of a base, offices and logistics buildings, as well as aircraft maintenance, facility management and personnel training.
However, the cost is not as high as the NT$6 billion (US$202.64 million) in illegal profit that Chinese vessels are making every year dredging sand in the Formosa Banks area, while causing severe land erosion and the loss of marine resources.
Over the past few years, China has continually dispatched warplanes and military vessels to harass Taiwan, threatening its national security. With an airborne unit, the coast guard could use the surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to more effectively curb unlawful dredging and other illegal activities that infringe upon Taiwan’s marine rights.
The unit could also assist in monitoring Chinese military activity in the Taiwan Strait and serve as an early-warning system to prevent accidental conflict.
The benefits of setting up a coast guard airborne unit to safeguard Taiwan’s marine rights and bolster national security far outweigh the equipment and training costs.
The many advantages that a coast guard airborne unit would bring to the nation make setting it up necessary and practical. The time has come for the government to make needed adjustments to its empty aircraft centralization policy.
Wu Tung-ming is a professor at the Central Police University’s Department of Maritime Police.
Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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