While righting past wrongs is hard, nothing could be harder than finding the truth and, in due course, reflecting on it. For most newly democratized nations, transitional justice is hard work that demands lots of time and effort.
The third wave of democratization that began in the 1970s finally swept Taiwan in the late 1980s. In 1996, the nation held its first direct presidential election. In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominee won the presidency, and the nation experienced its first change of ruling parties.
Today, Taiwan is widely recognized as one of the most successful third-wave democracies, as it went through a third peaceful transfer of power in 2016.
While it is essential to consolidate its democracy, Taiwan’s road to transitional justice has been paved with adversity. Governments over the past two decades failed to take the initiative to actively promote transitional justice.
From an authoritarian regime to a democratic government, pursuing transitional justice means addressing the atrocities of an authoritarian regime, including political persecution, violations of the rule of law and abuse of human rights.
There are four ways to deal with an authoritarian legacy: investigation of truth; clarification of responsibilities; apology and compensation to victims’ families, and building of monuments; and establishment of preventative mechanisms. The ultimate goal is to achieve democratic consolidation and social reconciliation.
However, transitional justice could widen social and political divisions, if the four measures taken are inappropriate.
During the administrations of former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), transitional justice dealt primarily with monetary reparations as a form of apology and compensation to the persecuted and their families.
This model contributed to the phenomenon of “10,000 victims without a single perpetrator,” also known as “there were only victims, but no perpetrators” as Academia Sinica research fellow Wu Nai-teh (吳乃德) said. Yet there were many existing political files to hold a lot of perpetrators accountable. The problem is how to deal with them.
At the time, any discussion of transitional justice would have been perceived as a power struggle between opposing camps, because Taiwanese society has been unable to reach a consensus on the historical interpretation of the mass atrocities during Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) regime.
As such, the better approach to dealing with transitional justice is to pursue historical justice by means of a systemic and thorough investigation of the truth, thereby promoting public reconciliation regarding historical events.
Some academics have argued that initiating transitional justice during the Chen administration would have been good timing. It was Taiwan’s first transfer of power and the DPP had an opportunity to implement democratic reforms. However, owing to shortsightedness, some efforts were insufficient.
In 2018, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) delivered on her election promise to pursue transitional justice, and the Transitional Justice Commission was set up in May. However, a leaked recording of an informal commission meeting in September last year revealed then-deputy chairman Chang Tien-chin (張天欽) allegedly proposing enforcing a lustration law to target former New Taipei City deputy mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), the KMT’s New Taipei City mayoral candidate at the time. The credibility of the commission was seriously undermined.
Now, with a one-year extension of the commission, the government must regain social trust and implement existing suggestions.
So far, the commission has four major achievements.
First, 99.7 percent of political files were declassified.
Second, the Taiwan Transitional Justice Database was established and made accessible online.
Third, it reopened full investigations into the murders of democracy advocate Lin I-hsiung’s (林義雄) mother and six-year-old twin daughters in 1980, as well as the death of Chen Wen-chen (陳文成), a Carnegie Mellon University assistant professor, in July 1981 during a visit to Taipei.
Fourth, the commission proposed “five suggestions in principle” about the transformation of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. They include removing the authoritarian characteristic of existing places; remembering historical traces, ranging from the period of Chiang’s authoritarian rule to the challenges rasied by civil society against his regime; promoting investigative studies of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and universal civic education; designing an institution that would be able to effectively implement those principles; and setting up transitional measures that are able to respond to the work of transitional justice in the process of transformation and law-amending.
The task at hand for the government should be how and when to implement these five suggestions. What is more important is that the commission be given sufficient time in a flexible manner, as it would be difficult to make progress in only one year.
Only by putting an end to the authoritarian period can Taiwan ultimately rebuild social trust and create a stronger political community. Transitional justice needs time and action.
Huang Yu-zhe is a political science undergraduate at Soochow University and has been accepted to National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Law and Interdisciplinary Studies.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath