“Taiwan’s defense is Japan’s defense” — look at a map and it is hard to think otherwise, and Beijing would agree.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has said that it would take Taiwan — by force if necessary. Take Beijing at its word.
However, that does not mean that it will succeed. Not if the price is too high — and the certainty of US and Japanese military involvement on Taiwan’s behalf puts things into the “too expensive” category.
Tokyo either helps Taipei defend itself or sits by and hopes that Taiwan does not come under Chinese control. If it is the latter option, Japan had better prepare to give Beijing a near veto over its military, political, economic and even domestic policies.
Japan just might also need to relinquish parts of its southern territory — starting with the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan. Why so dire?
Taiwan occupies strategic geography — sitting in the middle of the sea lanes through which much of Japan’s energy supplies and trade flow. Take Taiwan, and China can cut these whenever it wants.
Forget about “going around” the South China Sea. A PRC-controlled Taiwan would be a springboard for Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air operations into the heart of the central Pacific.
Japan’s southern defenses in the Ryukyu Islands are outflanked. Expect increased pressure in the East China Sea — and the Diaoyutais — and eventually a push to take the Ryukyus.
The knock-on effects are as frightening. Japan would only operate in Southeast Asia and elsewhere at Beijing’s sufferance. Japan’s regional influence would wane as partners draw back under Chinese pressure.
Even worse, the loss of Taiwan would deliver a body blow to the US’ position and prestige in Asia. Smaller regional nations would scramble to cut the best deal possible with the PRC.
That is bad news for a Japan that relies on the US to underwrite its defense. The days when Tokyo could rely on the US to “take care of” Taiwan are over, and Taiwan cannot survive on its own. The US is overstretched and needs the help Japan can provide with Taiwan. Indeed, the more Japan does, the more likely it is that the US will defend Japan.
With the US gone or staggered after Taiwan falls, Japan would face the near-impossible task of building up the Japan Self-Defense Forces to handle the PLA — and would need to “go nuclear.”
However, would Japan’s public not oppose military ties with Taiwan? The Japanese government might be surprised.
Opinion polls routinely show that large majorities with negative opinions of the PRC and its behavior. Japan’s public understands national security better than the politicians.
Still, there are the excuses for doing nothing: Can Japan not just let Taiwan go and cut a deal with China? It can.
However, Beijing breaks its promises, and there is not a shred of evidence Beijing will settle for “co-pre-eminence” in Asia along with Tokyo. It is incapable of regarding Japanese as equals.
Indeed, Chinese policy is as much a desire to put Japan “back in its place” and teach it a lesson for savaging China in the 20th century as it is about geopolitics.
Then there is the old standby: Certainly China would not upset its important economic relationship with Japan, would it?
Anybody care to take that bet? Economic ties have not much restrained Chinese behavior in recent times.
Just take the past decade: constant pressure around the Diaoyutais, a rare earth boycott, periodic “riots on demand” against Japanese companies in China, taking Japanese hostages for political reasons and nonstop anti-Japan propaganda. (Just watch Chinese TV some evening).
With Taiwan back in the fold it would be no holds barred for Beijing against the Japanese “dwarves.” That is Beijing’s word, not mine.
Japan’s business class would of course complain about upsetting economic ties. However, Japan Inc is about making money, not defending the nation. Listen to the Japan Business Federation and Japan would have surrendered a long time ago.
So forget about economic ties leading to peace in our time. More likely true is the adage that “the more willing and ready you are to fight, the less likely you will have to.”
Defense ties with Taiwan are a prerequisite.
What would defense cooperation between Tokyo and Taipei look like? Something that breaks Taiwan’s isolation and demonstrates Japan’s support (along with the US’) for Taiwan.
Start by exchanging liaison officers and, working with the Americans, cooperate in the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief field, making use of each nations’ amphibious forces.
It is easy to get the Republic of China Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) together on Guam for joint training. Navies can train anywhere.
Invite Taiwan to participate in missile defense activities and North Korea sanctions enforcement operations and have JASDF fighters from Okinawa (along with US Air Force aircraft) join the Taiwanese air force on missions when PLA aircraft fly around Taiwan looking to intimidate.
Ultimately, this is all about principles. Taiwan is an economically successful model of consensual government and individual liberty, just like Japan.
This is anathema to Beijing. It cannot justify the authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when there are competing examples of stable Asian nations.
For Japan’s own sake, Taiwan is worth defending. Turn away with eyes primly averted while a free people are enslaved and Japan will, at the very least, deserve contempt and even might be next. Tokyo can bet that the communist dictatorship that wants Taiwan will be coming after it in short order.
Japan still sees itself as the leading nation in Asia. If it is afraid of deepening defense ties with a free Taiwan for fear of Beijing, it might as well step into the back seat and let the CCP drive.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine Corps officer and is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.
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