The recall of Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) has begun, as the Kaohsiung City Election Commission on Tuesday said that campaigners have met the signature threshold for a vote, which is likely to happen in mid-June.
Many factors would complicate the outcome, and Han and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the coming months would try to stack the cards in their favor. For the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), there is a risk that they would try to turn the vote into a fight between the pan-blue and pan-green camps. On the national level, it should keep its distance, and leave the vote to Kaohsiung residents.
KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) has to support Han, although there is a possibility that mobilizing the party’s national resources for a local issue would do more harm than good. It looks certain that Han has no intention of resigning to pre-empt the recall, and there is reason to believe that he would challenge Chiang for the party chairmanship next year.
Internal divisions within the KMT are likely to emerge in the coming months regardless of whether Han is recalled. Chiang must find a way to rein him in, while appearing to be supportive, to bolster his own chances of remaining chairman.
The KMT-majority Kaohsiung City Council is planning to postpone the coming session for a month, ostensibly as part of the city’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to test holding council meetings remotely. The next session was to start on Thursday next week, and a plenary question-and-answer session, in which Han would face scrutiny over his performance, would have taken place on May 20, a month before the recall vote.
The postponement means the session would come after the vote. Was this a KMT ruse to ensure that Han does not have the opportunity for more gaffes prior to the vote?
The anticipated mid-June date for the recall vote originally suggested that the COVID-19 crisis might dampen voter turnout, which would work to Han’s advantage. Another factor is whether the vote takes place near the end of the month, and the long Dragon Boat Festival weekend. Young people registered to vote in Kaohsiung returning for the holiday would not be good for Han: This is the demographic that is most aggrieved by the mayor.
Immediately after the commission’s announcement, Han hired attorney Yeh Ching-yuan (葉慶元), who yesterday morning asked the Taipei High Administrative Court for an injunction against the recall. This is unlikely to succeed, but Yeh also used the occasion to question the involvement of Wecare Kaohsiung founder Aaron Yin (尹立), who is a major proponent of the recall.
Yeh said that Yin was the director-general of the Kaohsiung Bureau of Cultural Affairs under former Kaohsiung mayor Chen Chu (陳菊), a major DPP figure. He was insinuating that the recall drive was part of a plot by officials under the previous Kaohsiung City Government to pull Han down, and this was Yeh’s ploy to draw the DPP into the fight.
Making this recall process a battle between the KMT and the DPP would be destructive for both sides. Chen was a popular mayor, and attacking her now might consolidate Kaohsiung voters’ negative feelings toward Han. However, distracting attention from Han and focusing on pan-blue versus pan-green camp politics might help him. His perceived advantages as a maverick “everyman” appealed to voters in the original mayoral election, but many have since grown jaded with him.
Proponents of the recall should work to ensure that the debate remains focused on the mayor and his record in office.
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