North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is to shut the nation’s only known nuclear test site this week, ahead of an expected meeting with US President Donald Trump on June 12.
However, experts have said that the move is more symbolic than practical.
Here is all you need to know about the dismantling of Punggye-ri:
How did we get here? Kim disclosed plans to close the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri last month during a summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
It has been part of a wider charm offensive to portray the regime in Pyongyang as the driver of dialogue and progress. The closing ceremony is to take place between today and Friday, depending on the weather.
What was the site used for? All of North Korea’s six nuclear tests were conducted at the site under Mount Mantap in the northeastern interior of the nation. The most recent was in September last year, when Pyongyang claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb and caused a magnitude 6.3 earthquake that was felt across the border in China.
What will happen at the closing ceremony? North Korea has allowed a handful of international journalists — but none from South Korea — to watch the closing ceremony. Notably absent are experts or inspectors who could study the test site up close.
The visit would also include a stop in Wonsan, a tourist destination North Korea is hoping to promote to outsiders, a sign that the invitation is not about international transparency alone.
Closing the site is to follow a series of steps during the “ceremony,” including “making all tunnels of the test ground collapse by explosion; completely blocking entries; removing all observation facilities, research institutes and structures of guard units on the ground,” the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.
In the weeks leading up to the decommissioning, several buildings and sheds around the test site were razed, according to satellite images and analysis by monitoring group 38 North.
The photographs also showed construction of a new structure, which is likely to be a platform to allow visiting journalists to witness the explosions that would shut the entrances to the site.
“They had probably done a lot of damage to the site with the last test, so might as well get credit for a tunnel you don’t want to use,” said Vipin Narang, a politics professor who focuses on nuclear proliferation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “They’re also sanitizing the site, removing buildings so we don’t know what they did there and making sure no one with technical expertise is able to inspect the area.”
A study by Chinese geologists last month said the site had partially collapsed and was perhaps unusable, although Kim appeared to reject those claims, saying there were still two tunnels in good condition.
What will it achieve? “It is meaningful as a diplomatic gesture, especially since it’s being done in advance of the summit and of having an agreement in place,” 38 North managing editor Jenny Town said.
“It also signals to actors like China that provocations are unlikely in the near future, which can help repair relations that have soured over the past year of unrelenting testing, but at the same time, it is still a very small piece of the puzzle that doesn’t affect the North’s core nuclear capabilities or arsenal,” she said.
“Simply put, they can stop testing, because they have finished development and don’t need to test any more. Ultimately, it’s still just a first step down a long and difficult road if true denuclearization of the [Korean] Peninsula is to be achieved,” she added.
How will it affect the North’s nuclear capabilities? Kim is not doing anything that is against his interests in an attempt to placate the US, Narang said, adding that he believes the North could have other test sites.
However, Pyongyang has made it clear it no longer needs the proving ground, with Kim announcing in his New Year speech that the North’s nuclear arsenal was complete.
The regime also said it conducted “subcritical” nuclear tests last month, which allow scientists to test weapons without causing an atomic chain reaction or explosion.
Has this happened before? Well, kind of. There is a sense of deja vu among veteran North Korea watchers.
A similar spectacle was arranged in 2008, when the North blew up a cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. The symbolic step resulted in sanctions relief and led Washington to remove North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism, but negotiations eventually collapsed and the reactor was used to manufacture nuclear material.
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